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ABSTRACT 
  Over the past two decades, courts have consistently ruled that the 
manufacturer of a brand-name prescription drug cannot be liable for 
injuries suffered by those taking generic imitations of its product. This 
meant that a patient injured by a generic drug could have no remedy 
at all because in many instances the generic drug manufacturer would 
escape liability on the ground that it did not produce any information 
on which the patient’s doctor relied. It was a perplexing dilemma. The 
generic drug manufacturer made the product that the plaintiff 
received, the brand-name manufacturer produced all of the 
information the patient’s doctor saw, and neither manufacturer could 
be held liable even if each acted negligently. 
  The California Court of Appeal recently issued a stunning decision 
in which it concluded that a brand-name drug manufacturer could be 
liable to a plaintiff who took a generic version of its product. The 
reaction to the decision has been overwhelmingly negative. 
Commentators have condemned the decision as one of the worst 
rulings made by any court in recent years. Judges around the country 
have dismissed it as a misguided aberration from the otherwise strong 
judicial consensus on the issue. 
  Although the decision has been the subject of scathing criticism, 
this Article argues that the California court’s ruling actually represents 
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the first time that a court has properly examined this issue. In 
addition, the Article points out some weaknesses in the California 
court’s reasoning and proposes a novel general framework for 
analyzing the liability of brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a person goes to see her doctor about a minor 
health problem. The doctor writes a prescription for a drug that 
should help the patient. The doctor has seen advertisements for the 
drug in medical journals, heard about the drug during visits from its 
manufacturer’s sales representatives, and read all of the instructions 
and warnings provided in the drug’s labeling. Based on this 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
2011] TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1125 
information, the doctor has every reason to believe the drug will be 
safe and effective, but the drug turns out to have a terrible adverse 
effect on the patient. The doctor was unaware of this risk because the 
manufacturer did not mention it in the drug’s labeling, advertising, or 
other promotional efforts. If the manufacturer had done so, the 
doctor would not have written the prescription. The patient suffers 
severe, permanent harm from using the drug. Hoping to obtain fair 
compensation for her injuries, the patient retains a lawyer who 
investigates and finds proof that the drug’s manufacturer should have 
known about the risk and was extremely negligent in not providing 
warnings about it. 
Under these circumstances, the drug’s manufacturer will be 
liable for the harm resulting from its negligence. If the story changes 
in one small way, however, controversy and doubt will surround the 
patient’s case. Imagine that several companies manufacture the drug 
in question. One of them invented the drug, first brought it to market, 
and still sells it under a unique brand name. When that company’s 
patent on the drug expired, other companies began making and 
selling generic duplicates. In addition to reproducing the drug itself, 
the generic drug manufacturers copied verbatim all the warnings and 
other information on the brand-name drug’s labeling. When the 
hypothetical patient took her doctor’s prescription to a pharmacy, the 
pharmacist gave her one of the generic versions of the drug rather 
than the brand-name product. 
Assuming again that each of the drug makers should have known 
about the risk and that each acted unreasonably in not providing 
warnings about it, one might think the plaintiff would still have some 
legal remedy for her injuries. The fact that the patient received the 
generic drug, however, will drastically complicate her case and may 
prevent her from recovering compensation from anyone. If the 
patient sues the manufacturer of the brand-name drug, that 
manufacturer will insist it cannot be liable because the patient did not 
consume its product. If the patient sues the manufacturer of the 
generic drug she received, that manufacturer will insist it cannot be 
liable because the patient’s doctor did not look at or rely upon the 
generic product’s labeling or any other information disseminated by 
the generic manufacturer. In other words, one manufacturer supplied 
the drug that the patient received but not the information that her 
doctor saw; the other manufacturer provided the information but not 
the drug. According to the drug companies, this means neither 
manufacturer can be held responsible for the patient’s injuries. 
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Courts have confronted this sort of situation many times over the 
past two decades. Until recently, precedent almost uniformly favored 
defendants. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
rendered the seminal decision on the issue in 1994, ruling in Foster v. 
American Home Products Corp.1 that a brand-name drug 
manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries suffered by a 
patient who took the generic equivalent of the manufacturer’s 
product.2 Other courts around the country consistently followed the 
Fourth Circuit’s lead, rejecting various types of claims asserted 
against brand-name manufacturers by plaintiffs who took generic 
drugs.3 Although these decisions did not completely rule out the 
possibility that the generic drug’s manufacturer could be held liable, 
they left plaintiffs with the difficult task of finding a way around the 
fact that doctors rarely see or otherwise rely directly upon any 
information produced by the generic manufacturer. 
The issue seemed settled until the California Court of Appeal’s 
startling 2008 decision in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.4 Rejecting the 
reasoning of Foster and the long line of cases that followed it, the 
California court held that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable 
when the plaintiff took the generic version of the drug but alleged 
that her doctor relied on negligent misrepresentations made by the 
brand-name manufacturer.5 Despite ruling in the plaintiff’s favor on 
the claim against the brand-name drug maker, the court held that the 
generic manufacturer could not be held liable because the plaintiff’s 
doctor did not rely upon any information from that company.6 The 
Conte opinion thus reached the seemingly odd conclusion that the 
only manufacturer that could be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries was 
one that did not make the drug that the plaintiff received. 
Virtually all of the reaction to the Conte decision has been 
intensely negative. Commentators have mercilessly lambasted the 
California court for concluding that a drug manufacturer could be 
liable for injuries suffered by someone who took another company’s 
product.7 Lawyers who represent drug companies put Conte at the 
 
 1. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 2. Id. at 171–72. For a more detailed account of the case, see infra Part II.A. 
 3. See infra Part II.B. 
 4. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008). For a more detailed account 
of the case, see infra Part II.C. 
 5. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307–18. 
 6. Id. at 318–20. 
 7. See infra Part II.D. 
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head of the list of “worst drug and medical device product liability 
decisions of the year,”8 and tort reform advocates condemned it as 
“bad law, bad public policy and a national embarrassment.”9 
Likewise, other courts, now facing a split of authority on the issue, 
have been nearly unanimous in condemning Conte’s reasoning, siding 
with the older precedent of Foster and its progeny, and rejecting any 
attempts to hold brand-name drug manufacturers liable for generic 
drug injuries.10 
The issue has seized the attention of lawyers who represent 
plaintiffs and those who represent defendants in prescription drug 
litigation. Moreover, the ways in which courts think about and resolve 
the issue could have profound implications that extend well beyond 
the pharmaceutical context to cases involving other sorts of products. 
Despite its intricacy and importance, the issue has received very little 
scholarly attention to date.11 
This Article argues that plaintiffs who took generic drugs should 
be able to hold brand-name drug manufacturers liable in some 
circumstances. Although courts and commentators have 
overwhelmingly sided with the drug manufacturers, treating the 
Conte decision as a lonely and misguided deviation from past 
precedents and sound principles of products liability law, I contend 
that Conte should instead be seen as the first case in which a court 
finally got this issue right. The Conte court saw through distracting 
mischaracterizations of the issue that plagued judicial analysis in 
 
 8. James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Top Ten Best and Worst Prescription Drug/Medical 
Device Decisions of 2008—The Worst, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Dec. 23, 2008, 8:00 AM), http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/12/top-ten-best-and-worst-prescription.html. 
 9. Lawrence J. McQuillan & K. Lloyd Billingsley, Opinion: Don’t Hold Drugmakers 
Liable for Competitors’ Generics, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2009, at 13A. 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. The discussion in law journals by legal academics and students has been limited. See 
Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s Copycat 
Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673 (2010) (criticizing the Conte decision); Jean A. 
Brodie, Casenote, Foster v. American Home Products Corp.: Tort Liability for Injuries Caused 
by Someone Else’s Product?, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 431 (1995) (arguing that the Foster case 
was rightly decided); Beatrice Skye Resendes, Note, The Extinct Distinction of Privity: When a 
Generic Drug Label Fails to Warn, the Drug’s Pioneer Should Be Liable as Component Part 
Supplier of the Warning Label, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 95 (2009) (arguing that brand-name 
drug makers should be subject to strict liability on the ground that a generic drug’s warning 
label is essentially a component supplied by the brand-name product’s manufacturer). Lawyers 
who represent drug companies have also argued that Conte was wrongly decided. See Bridget 
M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris, Name Brand Exposure for Generic Drug Use: Prescription for 
Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767 (2009). 
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Foster and other past cases. Applying basic rules of liability for 
negligence, the court correctly recognized that a manufacturer may be 
liable in some instances for tortious conduct other than having made 
or sold the product that inflicted plaintiff’s injuries. Although all 
questions about liability for prescription drugs should be handled 
with special care because of the unique difficulty of developing new 
drugs and their immense potential benefits for consumers, the Conte 
court soundly concluded that fairness and policy considerations 
ultimately weigh against giving brand-name manufacturers complete 
immunity from liability for generic drug injuries. 
At the same time, the Conte court erred in concluding that only 
the brand-name drug maker, and not the manufacturer of the generic 
drug that the plaintiff received, could be liable. The court allowed the 
generic manufacturer to escape liability on the ground that it did not 
supply any of the information the plaintiff’s doctor considered in 
deciding to prescribe the drug. Given that doctors seldom see generic 
drug labeling or other information disseminated by generic 
manufacturers, this approach essentially amounts to absolving generic 
manufacturers of all liability for inadequate warnings or 
misrepresentations about their products. This creates far too much of 
an imbalance between the potential liability of the brand-name 
manufacturer and its generic counterparts, with the former bearing a 
disproportionate share of the burden of liability when brand-name 
and generic manufacturers alike provided inadequate or inaccurate 
information about the drug. 
Drawing on these critical assessments of Conte and previous 
court decisions, this Article proposes a new general framework for 
drug manufacturer liability. The proposed scheme recognizes that in 
some instances a plaintiff can assert viable claims against both the 
brand-name and generic drug producers. For example, when the 
brand-name manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injuries by 
negligently designing the product or failing to give adequate warnings 
about its dangers, but the plaintiff took a generic version of the drug, 
sufficient grounds exist for imposing liability on both the brand-name 
and generic manufacturers. At the same time, the framework outlined 
here accepts the possibility of imposing liability on multiple 
manufacturers but strives to achieve a fair distribution of the 
responsibility among the manufacturers. The generic manufacturer in 
the above example profited from selling the product taken by the 
plaintiff, and its connection to the plaintiff’s injuries is even stronger 
and more direct than that of the brand-name manufacturer. As a 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
2011] TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1129 
result, the generic manufacturer should bear primary liability for the 
plaintiff’s injuries, with the brand-name manufacturer having only 
secondary liability in the event that the generic drug maker has gone 
out of business or is otherwise unable to pay the damages. With its 
pivotal distinction between primarily and secondarily liable 
tortfeasors, this framework can be applied in other complex torts 
scenarios and therefore has implications far beyond the context of 
prescription drug liability. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the federal 
regulatory scheme governing brand-name and generic drugs. It 
focuses on the regulations concerning changes to drug labeling 
because the ability of brand-name and generic manufacturers to 
change their product’s labeling is a crucial part of the debate over 
what liability they should face under tort law. Part I also provides a 
basic look at the various types of claims that can be asserted in 
products liability cases. Part II then examines the court decisions 
regarding liability of brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. It 
follows the history from the Fourth Circuit’s highly influential ruling 
in the Foster case and the long line of cases in which other courts 
embraced Foster’s reasoning to the California Court of Appeal’s bold 
decision in Conte to defy that precedent. Part III delves into the 
complex array of arguments made in these cases by plaintiffs and 
defendants. Which of the arguments should prevail is a close and 
difficult question, whether viewed in terms of tort law principles or 
policy, but the analysis ultimately tips toward plaintiffs. Part III 
therefore concludes that a brand-name drug manufacturer should be 
held liable when it negligently causes harm to plaintiffs taking the 
generic equivalent of its product. Finally, Part IV lays out in more 
detail a proposed approach to imposing liability on brand-name and 
generic drug manufacturers. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The issues raised by cases like Foster and Conte lie at the 
intersection of two intricate and often controversial bodies of law. 
This Part begins with an overview of the first of those areas, the 
federal regulatory scheme governing prescription drugs, and focuses 
in particular on how federal law enables generic and brand-name 
manufacturers to exercise control over a drug’s labeling. It then 
introduces the basic principles of state tort law that govern products 
liability claims. 
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A. Brand-Name and Generic Drugs 
Federal law requires pharmaceutical companies to obtain 
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before 
distributing any new drugs.12 A manufacturer submitting a new drug 
application to the FDA must provide extensive test data and other 
information to show that the drug is both safe and effective.13 The 
manufacturer also must provide the labeling it proposes to use for the 
drug, including the instructions and warnings about the drug’s 
potential dangers.14 
The FDA approval process is expensive, time consuming, and 
unpredictable.15 A manufacturer faces an average wait of 
approximately eight and one-half years between the time it 
synthesizes a new drug and the point when the FDA approves the 
drug for sale.16 Developing a new drug and obtaining FDA approval 
 
 12. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). Federal law technically applies only to drugs “introduce[d] or 
deliver[ed] for introduction into interstate commerce,” id., but the FDA’s jurisdiction has been 
interpreted broadly so that it essentially covers all business that drug companies conduct in the 
United States, see, e.g., FDA, COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE § 100.200 (2009), http://www.fda.gov
/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073820.htm (asserting that 
the FDA has jurisdiction over any pharmaceutical product containing an ingredient that was 
shipped in interstate commerce). 
 13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
 14. Id. § 355(b)(1)(F). Detailed specifications for a drug’s labeling can be found at 21 
C.F.R. § 201.80 (2010). 
 15. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 
111 YALE L.J. 151, 164–66 (2001) (describing the FDA drug approval process—which requires 
animal testing and three phases of human clinical testing, during each of which the FDA can 
request further testing or studies). 
 16. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug 
Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004) 
(estimating that research, development, testing, and FDA review of a new drug takes a 
minimum of three years, an average of eight and one-half years, and sometimes as long as 
twenty years). 
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for it can cost hundreds of millions of dollars.17 Most drugs never 
receive FDA approval.18 
The financial rewards for obtaining FDA approval of a new drug 
can be substantial. The drug’s developer typically obtains a patent 
that gives it the exclusive right to make and sell the drug for a limited 
time. Though a patent is generally effective for twenty years after 
filing of the patent application,19 much of that time could be 
consumed by the process of obtaining FDA approval to begin selling 
the drug.20 A special provision in federal law therefore permits drug 
companies to seek up to a five-year extension of a patent’s lifespan.21 
Drug companies have a number of other tactics for attempting to 
stretch the duration of their patents,22 but the manufacturer’s 
monopoly over any drug eventually will come to an end. For any 
profitable drug, a host of other pharmaceutical companies will be 
waiting to pounce and begin selling generic versions when patent 
protection expires.23 
 
 17. The average cost of developing a new drug is often estimated to be over $800 million. 
E.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
503, 510–11 (2009). Skeptics contend that the $800 million figure is a gross exaggeration, but 
concede that the average cost of developing a new drug is at least $100 million. See, e.g., 
MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 37–41 (2004) (estimating that the cost of research and development 
before taxes was approximately $265 million per drug in 2000 and $455 million per drug in 
2001); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW 
DRUGS 236–46 (2004) (noting that studies by the Public Citizen and Global Alliance estimated 
that the cost of developing a new drug is between $115 million and $240 million). 
 18. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15, at 163 n.46 (“An estimated three-fourths of all 
drugs for which drug manufacturers seek marketing approval fail to reach the market due 
largely to concerns regarding safety and efficacy, as well as undercapitalization of 
manufacturers.”). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 20. Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: 
Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 52 (2003). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A). 
 22. See Melody Wirz, Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years?—A Closer Look at 
Pharmaceuticals, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 3–7 (2003), http://www.okjolt.com/images/pdf/
2003okjoltrev5.pdf (describing four ways that brand-name drug manufacturers effectively 
extend the life of their patents: using legislative loopholes and lobbying, initiating litigation 
alleging patent infringement, layering patents and combining drugs to create new patents, and 
advertising and developing brand names to increase barriers to generic entry). 
 23. A generic manufacturer that successfully challenges the validity of the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent, rather than waiting for the patent to expire, may be rewarded with a 180-
day exclusivity period during which no one else can sell a generic version of the product. See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006) (allowing the first generic applicant to file an abbreviated new 
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Generic drug makers are not required to go through the same 
arduous application process as the drug’s original manufacturer. They 
can instead submit “[a]bbreviated new drug applications” to the 
FDA,24 a shortcut that saves time and money because it does not 
require any independent proof that the drug is safe or effective. In 
essence, the manufacturer seeking to begin selling a generic drug 
must show that its product will be a mere replica of the brand-name 
or “listed” drug already approved by the FDA. The generic drug 
maker must certify that the generic product will have the same active 
ingredient or ingredients as the listed drug; that its route of 
administration and strength will be the same as the listed drug; and 
that its instructions, warnings, and other labeling also will be identical 
to those of the listed drug.25 Moreover, the generic and brand-name 
drugs must be “bioequivalent,”26 meaning that the two drugs would 
have essentially the same effect on a person taking them.27 This 
shortcut to FDA approval benefits consumers by speeding generic 
drugs to the market as soon as patent protection of the listed brand-
name drug expires.28 
Many doctors continue to prescribe a drug by its familiar brand 
name even after generic versions of the drug have become available. 
State laws give pharmacists the option to fill such prescriptions with 
the cheaper generic equivalent unless the doctor prohibited the 
pharmacist from doing so by including a specific notation such as “do 
not substitute” or “dispense as written” on the prescription.29 
 
drug application (ANDA) to sell its drug without competition from later ANDA applicants for 
180 days). 
 24. Id. § 355(j). 
 25. Id.  §  355(j)(2)(A). The regulations contain some narrow exceptions to these 
requirements, such as provisions under which differences between the generic drug and the 
listed drug can be specially approved by the FDA. Id. § 355(j)(2)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 314.93 (2010). 
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
 27. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (defining “[b]ioequivalence” as “the absence of 
a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug 
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions”). 
 28. If generic drug makers file ANDAs before the listed drug’s patent protection expires, 
the FDA’s approval to start marketing the generic drugs becomes effective as soon as the patent 
expires. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III), (j)(5)(B)(ii). 
 29. See Thomas P. Christensen, Duane M. Kirking, Frank J. Ascione, Lynda S. Welage & 
Caroline A. Gaither, Drug Product Selection: Legal Issues, 41 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 868, 869 
(2001) (noting that all states now have drug product-selection laws). For examples of typical 
state laws, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4073 (West 2007); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6810(6) 
(McKinney 2003); and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 562.008 (West 2001). 
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Brand-name drug manufacturers spend billions of dollars every 
year to promote their products.30 In addition to running 
advertisements and sending sales representatives to visit doctors, 
manufacturers pay to have information about brand-name drugs 
included in the Physicians’ Desk Reference,31 an annual publication 
that has become most doctors’ primary source of information about 
drugs. The book is distributed to physicians free of charge, and it can 
be found in virtually every doctor’s office, pharmacy, and clinic.32 The 
entry for each drug in the Physicians’ Desk Reference includes a 
verbatim reproduction of the product’s FDA-approved labeling.33 
Manufacturers sometimes continue to promote brand-name 
drugs aggressively even after generic versions have entered the 
market.34 The brand-name manufacturers’ hope is that doctors’ 
familiarity with the brand names will continue to give their products 
an edge over the generic equivalents.35 
Generic manufacturers, on the other hand, typically do not spend 
money to promote their products. Indeed, generic drug 
manufacturers’ business model is to keep costs and prices low by 
spending nothing on advertising or other marketing, and instead to 
rely on the brand-name drug manufacturers’ promotional efforts to 
generate sales of the product.36 Though brand-name drug makers 
typically pay to have their products included in the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference, for example, generic drug makers do not.37 
 
 30. Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 31–32 (2008) 
(estimating that drug companies spent $57.5 billion on promotional efforts in the United States 
in 2004, almost twice as much as they spent on research and development). 
 31. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (64th ed. 2010). 
 32. Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 684 A.2d 944, 945 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 33. Brief of Appellant at 5, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(Nos. A116707, A117353), 2007 WL 3032224. 
 34. See Sarah P. Bryan & Thomas L. Hafemeister, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ 
Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 505–06 (2009) 
(“Because manufacturers of generic drugs spend significantly less on marketing than their 
brand-name counterparts, doctors are probably ‘less likely to think of generic alternatives’ when 
writing prescriptions.” (quoting Benjamin P. Falit, Curbing Industry Sponsors’ Incentive to 
Design Post-Approval Trials that Are Suboptimal for Informing Prescribers but More Likely 
than Optimal Designs to Yield Favorable Results, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 969, 1001 (2007))). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1500–03 (2008) (describing how generic 
manufacturers free ride on brand-name manufacturers’ extensive promotional efforts). 
 37. Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 5. 
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Generic drug manufacturers thus have the chance to earn 
substantial profits by riding on the coattails of brand-name 
manufacturers’ efforts. With no new research or testing to be done, a 
generic manufacturer typically incurs relatively low costs in obtaining 
FDA approval to begin marketing a generic version of an existing 
drug.38 The generic drug makers’ share of the overall prescription 
drug market has been steadily rising, with pharmacists now turning to 
generic products to fill about two out of three prescriptions.39 
Prescription drugs continue to be a booming business for brand-
name as well as generic manufacturers. Total revenue from sales in 
the United States reached $234.1 billion in 2008, up from just $40.3 
billion in 1990 and $120.6 billion in 2000.40 Although drug companies’ 
financial fortunes have slipped from the heights they reached a few 
years ago, when pharmaceutical manufacturing consistently topped 
lists of the nation’s most profitable industries,41 drug makers still 
enjoy a spot near the top of the most recent rankings with a robust 
19.3 percent return on revenues and a 23 percent profit for 
shareholders.42 
Drug makers, whether on the brand-name or generic sides of the 
business, believe claims brought against them under state tort law 
should be preempted by the federal laws that regulate drugs,43 but 
those arguments have not been faring well in courts. In its 2009 ruling 
in Wyeth v. Levine,44 the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a crushing blow to 
the argument that the FDA’s approval of a drug and its labeling 
shields the manufacturer from state-law tort liability for failing to 
 
 38. Roin, supra note 17, at 510–11 (reporting estimates that the average cost of introducing 
a generic drug is only $2 million, compared to over $800 million for an original brand-name 
drug). 
 39. Micah Hartman, Anne Martin, Patricia McDonnell, Aaron Catlin & Nat’l Health 
Expenditure Accounts Team, National Health Spending in 2007: Slower Drug Spending 
Contributes to Lowest Rate of Overall Growth Since 1998, 28 HEALTH AFF. 246, 250 (2009). 
 40. Micah Hartman, Anne Martin, Olivia Nuccio, Aaron Catlin & Nat’l Health 
Expenditure Accounts Team, Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in 2008, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 147, 148 exhibit 1 (2010). 
 41. GOOZNER, supra note 17, at 233. 
 42. Top Industries: Most Profitable, FORTUNE (May 4, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits. 
 43. For more detailed discussions of the drug industry’s federal preemption arguments, see 
Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 1089, 1095 (2007); Christina Marie Martin, Note, Hugs and Drugs: Research Ethics, 
Conflict of Interest, and Why the FDA’s Attempt to Preempt Pharma Failure-to-Warn Claims Is a 
Dangerous Prescription, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 587, 593 (2008). 
 44. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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provide adequate warnings.45 That case involved a brand-name drug, 
so generic manufacturers maintained some hope that they could 
distinguish it by emphasizing the unique restraints that federal law 
imposes on them, such as the requirement that a generic drug have 
the same labeling as the brand-name product.46 Federal district courts 
split over the issue,47 federal appellate courts ruled against the generic 
manufacturers’ preemption arguments, and the Supreme Court 
recently agreed to decide the issue.48 Without a federal preemption 
defense, the proper scope of tort liability will continue to be a major 
issue for generic and brand-name drug makers alike. And if the 
Supreme Court should find that federal law preempts claims against 
generic drug manufacturers, the question of whether brand-name 
drug makers can be liable to those who took generic drugs will take 
on greater significance than ever before. 
B. Labeling Requirements 
One specific aspect of the federal regulation of prescription 
drugs is particularly relevant to the issue of how tort law should apply 
to brand-name and generic drug manufacturers: if a drug’s labeling is 
dangerously inadequate or misleading, who can correct that problem? 
Despite some debate and disagreement surrounding this question, the 
bottom-line answer is that both the brand-name manufacturer and 
the generic producers of the drug have the ability and responsibility 
to fix flaws in drug labeling. 
 
 45. See id. at 1204 (“Wyeth has not persuaded us that failure-to-warn claims like Levine’s 
obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling.”). 
 46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Kim M. Schmid & Shane V. Bohnen, Generic Drugs and Preemption After Wyeth 
v. Levine, 22 HEALTH LAW. 35, 36 & n.17 (2009). 
 48. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because state 
imposition of duties to warn on generic drug manufacturers neither renders compliance with 
federal regulation impossible nor obstructs the goals of that regulation, we affirm the district 
court’s finding that the Demahy’s state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted.”), cert. 
granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 
10, 2010) (No. 09-1501); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605–12 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e 
decline to assume that Congress intended to shield from tort liability the manufacturers of the 
majority of the prescription drugs consumed in this country and leave injured parties like 
Mensing no legal remedy.”), cert. granted sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3522, 
79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-993), and 
Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3523, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1039). 
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After it begins to sell a drug, a manufacturer has continuing 
obligations with respect to the drug’s safety.49 These include an 
obligation to add an additional warning to the label “as soon as there 
is reasonable evidence of a causal association” between a drug and a 
clinically significant hazard.50 Indeed, pursuant to a regulatory 
measure known as the “Changes Being Effected” provision, a 
manufacturer can immediately revise a drug’s label, without first 
obtaining FDA approval, if the change gives doctors reason to be 
more cautious about the drug.51 This includes deleting from the label 
any “false, misleading, or unsupported indications” about the drug’s 
use or effectiveness, as well as adding or strengthening statements on 
the label about “a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse 
reaction” or “an instruction about dosage and administration that is 
intended to increase the safe use of the drug product.”52 
The FDA has made clear that the obligation to seek labeling 
changes when safety concerns arise extends to generic drug makers.53  
When a generic drug manufacturer believes additional or 
 
 49. Federal law requires drug manufacturers to submit certain “postmarketing reports” to 
the FDA, including prompt reports of any serious and unexpected adverse experience suffered 
by a user of the drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2010), and annual reports describing any other 
significant new information that might affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the product, 
id. § 314.81. These reporting requirements are the same for generic drug makers as they are for 
brand-name drug producers. Id. § 314.98. 
 50. Id. § 201.57(c)(6) (subjecting drugs approved by the FDA after June 30, 2001, to the 
new rule); see also id. § 201.80(e) (providing the same rule for older drugs approved by the FDA 
before June 30, 2001). 
 51. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). 
 52. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)–(D). The FDA also has emphasized that adding text to 
the packaging and other materials provided with the drug is not the sole means by which a drug 
maker can seek to inform doctors of concerns about the safety of a product. In addition to 
warnings provided with the product itself, a manufacturer may opt to send additional 
information directly to physicians by issuing “Dear Doctor” letters containing new 
precautionary information about a drug. Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content 
and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (June 26, 
1979); see also Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“The 
FDA has made clear that warnings other than labeling changes, such as letters to health care 
professionals, are permissible and the labeling regulations do not bar them.”). Such mailings 
may be considered part of the drug’s labeling for FDA regulatory purposes. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 202.1(l)(2). 
 53. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 
28, 1992) (“If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be added to a 
product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the 
generic and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA, if an ANDA holder 
believes that new safety information should be added, it should provide adequate supporting 
information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed 
drugs should be revised.”). 
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strengthened warnings should be given, or an erroneous or misleading 
statement should be corrected, the manufacturer must inform the 
FDA so that the FDA can determine whether the labeling for the 
drug should be revised.54 
The tricky and controversial question is whether a generic drug 
manufacturer can unilaterally add or strengthen its warnings without 
prior FDA approval. Although a brand-name manufacturer can add 
or strengthen warnings without FDA approval pursuant to the 
“Changes Being Effected” regulation, the FDA has taken the 
position that generic drug manufacturers do not have the same 
power.55 Many courts, however, have suggested that the “Changes 
Being Effected” regulation does allow generic manufactures to add or 
strengthen warnings without prior FDA approval.56 
Uncertainty thus exists about whether a generic drug 
manufacturer can ever unilaterally change a drug’s labeling, but there 
is no doubt that a generic drug manufacturer can ask the FDA for 
permission to add or strengthen the warnings in its labeling.57 And as 
a result, any change to a drug’s labeling will be synchronized, through 
FDA coordination, so that the change applies to both brand-name 
and generic versions of the drug, regardless of which manufacturer 
may have initiated the change. When the brand-name manufacturer 
modifies its labeling, the FDA will track the changes and notify 
generic drug makers that they must revise their labeling as well.58 And 
when the FDA approves a labeling change requested by a generic 
manufacturer, the FDA will direct the brand-name manufacturer to 
make the same change so that the labeling for all versions of the drug 
remains consistent.59 All manufacturers of a drug, including those 
producing it in generic form, thus share responsibility for identifying 
and eliminating dangers posed by insufficient or inaccurate labeling. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,848, 2,849 n.1 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
 56. E.g., Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 439–44 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 
09-1501); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994); Stacel v. Teva 
Pharm., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905–07 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 57. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (providing a mechanism for requesting FDA approval to make 
changes to labeling); id. § 314.97 (stating that generic drug manufacturers can seek permission, 
pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, to make labeling changes). 
 58. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,961. 
 59. Id. 
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C. Products Liability 
Having drawn this basic portrait of the federal regulatory scheme 
that governs prescription drugs, a brief sketch of products liability law 
is the next element that must be added into the picture. Products 
liability is a broad term that describes an entire field of law rather 
than a single cause of action.60 It is largely a species of tort law, 
although it also has a significant vein of contract law embedded 
within it because the sale of a product is a contractual relationship.61 
Products can be dangerous in an endless variety of ways, but four 
basic categories of problems dominate the field: manufacturing 
defects, design defects, inadequate warnings, and misrepresentations. 
Manufacturing defects result from errors made during production, 
such as the misplacement of a part by an assembly line worker in a 
factory.62 A design defect, on the other hand, renders every unit of the 
product dangerous because of some flaw in the blueprints, recipe, or 
other design specifications originally developed for the product.63 
Other products liability claims relate to information about the 
product, rather than a flaw in the actual product itself. The warnings 
and instructions accompanying a product may be insufficient to 
protect users from the product’s dangers,64 and a misrepresentation or 
false statement about the product also may lead to accidents and 
injuries.65 
To complicate matters, a plaintiff may assert each of these four 
basic types of products liability claims under any of three different 
legal theories—negligence, strict tort liability, and breach of 
warranty.66 For example, a plaintiff injured by a product may 
simultaneously claim that the product’s manufacturer acted 
negligently, assert that the manufacturer is subject to strict tort 
liability because the product was in a “defective” and “unreasonably 
dangerous” condition,67 and argue that the manufacturer is liable for 
 
 60. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.1, at 1, 3 (2d ed. 2008). 
 61. Professor William Prosser famously and vividly described breach of warranty, a type of 
products liability claim, as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.” 
William L. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 
1099, 1126 (1960). 
 62. OWEN, supra note 60, § 7.1, at 446. 
 63. Id. § 8.1, at 499. 
 64. Id. § 9.1, at 581. 
 65. Id. § 3.1, at 113–14. 
 66. Id. § 1.3, at 29–34. 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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breaching an implied warranty that the product would be “fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”68 Although 
negligence is the “classic products liability claim” and continues to 
have an important role in products liability law, it has been 
overshadowed in recent decades by strict tort liability and breach of 
warranty.69 A negligence claim requires proof that the defendant 
failed to exercise reasonable care; strict tort liability and breach of 
warranty claims do not necessarily require any proof of carelessness 
or other fault.70 Strict tort liability and breach of warranty therefore 
are two theories under which strict or no-fault liability could be 
imposed.71 As a result, these claims are often easier to prove than 
negligence claims and may be the most potent weapons for plaintiffs 
in products liability cases and the most severe threat to defendants.72 
Although no-fault liability theories have advantages for 
plaintiffs, they also come with a variety of important limitations that 
 
 68. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1978). 
 69. OWEN, supra note 60, § 2.1, at 60–61. 
 70. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963) (describing 
how strict liability had been imposed on manufacturers via breach of warranty claims and 
concluding that strict liability should be imposed under tort law as well). 
 71. OWEN, supra note 60, § 5.9, at 329–31 (discussing the distinction between strict liability 
and negligence). Intense controversy exists about the extent to which courts truly impose strict 
liability in products cases. Many contend that strict liability has been more of an illusion than a 
reality, with courts paying lip service to the notion of strict liability even when actually using a 
negligence or fault-based approach. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design 
Defect: From Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 
643–49 (1980) (“Imposing a negligence standard for design defect liability is in many cases only 
to define in a coherent fashion what litigants are in fact arguing and what jurors are in essence 
analyzing.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990) (asserting 
that, in attempting to reconcile the “rhetoric” of strict liability with “traditional negligence 
balancing,” some courts have “create[d] verbal distinctions that have little practical 
consequence other than to confuse litigants and commentators”); David G. Owen, Defectiveness 
Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 785–86 (“As 
courts and commentators have come to recognize the inherent unworkability, illogic, and even 
incomprehensibility of such a doctrine in design and warnings cases, the very idea that liability 
in these central contexts is ‘strict’ has been viewed increasingly as a myth.”); Ellen Wertheimer, 
Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1269–71 (1992) (“Strict products liability has been abolished by judicial 
decisions . . . that were faithless to the goals and purposes for which strict products liability was 
adopted.”). 
 72. But see Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability 
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 940 (2002) (suggesting that 
strict liability theories may not actually provide an advantage to plaintiffs because juries 
respond more favorably to claims phrased in terms of negligence rather than liability without 
fault). 
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do not apply to negligence claims.73 In particular, both strict tort 
liability and warranties claims are special, narrow theories that 
pertain only to a limited set of situations. Strict tort liability applies 
only to “[o]ne who sells” a product that is defective and unreasonably 
dangerous.74 Likewise, liability for breach of warranty can be imposed 
only on those who sold the product that harmed the plaintiff.75 
Negligence, on the other hand, is a far more general, universal theory 
of liability. It applies to situations within the field of products liability 
law that the no-fault theories do not reach, and it also extends far 
beyond products liability law to a vast array of other situations in 
which injuries occur. Negligence is essentially the all-purpose tool of 
tort law, and its scope is much wider than that of more specialized 
instruments like strict tort liability or warranties. 
Determining how this array of potential grounds for liability 
should apply to prescription drugs is perhaps the single most 
controversial and confusing area within products liability law.76 Courts 
and commentators are virtually unanimous in feeling that “drugs are 
different” from other products because they offer extraordinary 
potential benefits to humanity while also posing severe potential 
dangers, but intense disagreement exists over the implications of 
those differences.77 The debate over liability of brand-name and 
generic drug manufacturers represents another fierce clash on this 
already “war-weary terrain.”78 
 
 73. OWEN, supra note 60, § 2.1, at 60–61. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965); see also id. § 402B (imposing 
strict liability on one who makes misrepresentations about a product “sold by him”). The Third 
Restatement on Products Liability also addresses only the liability of those who sold the product 
in question. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1, 9 (1998) 
(providing liability rules for “[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products”). 
 75. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1978). 
 76. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–67 (“Whether and how prescription drugs in 
particular should be treated differently from other types of products has consumed more time 
and effort, and resulted in the gnashing of more teeth, than about any other particularized issue 
in all of products liability law.”). 
 77. Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement 
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 209–10 (1999); see also OWEN, 
supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–80 (describing the controversy over design-defect claims concerning 
prescription drugs); id. § 9.6, at 627–45 (describing the controversy over inadequate warning 
claims concerning prescription drugs). 
 78. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 568. 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
2011] TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1141 
II.  THE CASES 
With this background in mind, this Part turns to the specific 
problem of injuries suffered by those who take a generic version of a 
prescription drug. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Foster v. American 
Home Products Corp. and the California Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. dominate the landscape examined here.79 I 
review the factual background of each case in close detail, both 
because they are the most significant precedents and also because 
these decisions concern real problems that have serious consequences 
for plaintiffs and defendants alike. Though it might be easy to lapse 
into thinking about the legal issues in more abstract terms, the reality 
is that very significant interests, with tangible impacts on many 
people’s lives, are at stake on both sides of these cases. 
A. Foster v. American Home Products Corp. 
Craig and Karen Foster were the parents of infant twins, a girl 
named Brandy and a boy named Bradley.80 When the twins were six 
weeks old, they had a bout of colic,81 a common condition 
characterized by irritability, crying, and apparent abdominal pain.82 
The Fosters took the twins to their pediatrician, who prescribed 
Phenergan syrup,83 a brand-name antihistamine and sedative drug 
used to treat allergies and many other medical conditions.84 The 
pharmacist who filled the prescription substituted promethazine 
syrup, the generic version of the prescribed drug.85 The Fosters gave 
the generic product to the babies several times over the next few 
days.86 On September 11, 1988, the morning after they last gave the 
drug to the twins, the Fosters found Brandy dead in her crib.87 
Doctors concluded that Brandy died as a result of Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome (SIDS) caused by use of the drug.88 
 
 79. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 80. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Russell S. Agnes & Richard L. Mones, Infantile Colic: A Review, 4 J. DEVELOPMENTAL 
& BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 57, 57 (1983). 
 83. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167. 
 84. Phenergan, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/phenergan.html (last visited Jan. 5, 
2011). 
 85. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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The Fosters sued the manufacturer of the brand-name drug their 
doctor prescribed, as well as the manufacturer of the generic version 
they actually received from the pharmacy and gave to their daughter 
before her death.89 The Fosters pointed to medical studies showing 
that the drug posed a significant risk of causing SIDS.90 The Fosters 
alleged that the brand-name manufacturer had been aware of these 
studies prior to Brandy’s death but ignored them because stronger 
warnings about the drug’s dangers for young children would have 
reduced sales of the product and interfered with the company’s hopes 
of winning FDA approval to sell the drug as an over-the-counter 
product.91 Although the drug’s labeling contained statements advising 
that the product was “not recommended for children under 2 years of 
age”92 and “should not be used in children under 2 years of age 
because safety for such use has not been established,”93 the Fosters 
characterized those statements as standard “legalistic” language that 
merely indicated the manufacturer had not yet done specific studies 
to document the drug’s safety for children.94 The Fosters argued that 
these sorts of statements frequently appeared on the labeling of drugs 
widely prescribed for young children’s use, and that doctors 
interpreted them as meaning that the manufacturer had no reason to 
think the drug posed any special problems for children.95 The Fosters 
further alleged that the brand-name manufacturer had explicitly 
 
 89. Id. After filing their lawsuit, the Fosters learned that they had sued the wrong generic 
drug manufacturer. The generic drug taken by their daughter had been manufactured by My-K 
Laboratories, not Barre-National Corporation, as the Fosters initially believed. The Fosters’ 
claims against Barre-National thus were dismissed, and the Fosters filed a new action against 
My-K Laboratories. Id. 
 90. Several articles were written before Brandy Foster’s death. See André Kahn & Denise 
Blum, Phenothiazines and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 70 PEDIATRICS 75 (1982) (reporting 
the findings of a study concluding that phenothiazine is related to SIDS); André Kahn & Denise 
Blum, Possible Role of Phenothiazines in Sudden Infant Death, 314 LANCET 364 (1979) 
(presenting evidence of a relationship between the administration of a phenothiazine and sleep 
apnea, which could be related to SIDS); André Kahn, Daniele Hasaerts & Denise Blum, 
Phenothiazine-Induced Sleep Apneas in Normal Infants, 75 PEDIATRICS 844 (1985) (reporting 
the findings of a study concluding that phenothiazine is related to SIDS). Promethazine, the 
drug taken by Brandy Foster, is a phenothiazine derivative. Stewart v. Astrue, 551 F. Supp. 2d 
1308, 1313 n.7 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 91. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 6–7, Foster, 29 F.3d 165 (No. 93-1627), 1993 WL 
13121590. 
 92. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 35, Foster, 29 F.3d 165 (No. 93-1627), 1993 WL 
13121591. 
 93. Id. at 5, 35. 
 94. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 17–19, 30. 
 95. Id. 
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misrepresented the drug’s safety for children by claiming in the drug’s 
labeling and Physicians’ Desk Reference entry that “[c]hildren 
tolerate this product well.”96 The brand-name manufacturer also 
promoted Phenergan products with advertisements that featured 
illustrations of the Seven Dwarfs from the fairy tale Snow White and 
touted the drug’s benefits for kids with coughs, colds, and allergies.97 
One of the key factual questions in the case was what motivated 
the Fosters’ pediatrician to prescribe the drug, but the evidence on 
that point was muddled. The doctor stated that he had never seen, 
and therefore had never relied upon, any information from the drug’s 
generic manufacturers.98 The extent to which he relied on labeling, 
advertising, or other information generated by the brand-name 
manufacturer was much less clear. In a deposition, the doctor testified 
that he had been familiar with Phenergan since he received his initial 
medical training, and that he had used it many times in treating 
patients throughout his career as a pediatrician.99 He said that 
Phenergan had been so widely used, for so many years, that he 
considered it to be “like using Tylenol or things of that nature.”100 The 
doctor further testified that he generally relied on manufacturers to 
advise him of a drug’s potential dangers, and that he obtained 
information about Phenergan from the manufacturer’s advertising 
and from reading newsletters and other medical literature.101 The 
doctor added that he would not have prescribed Phenergan for the 
Foster children if he had been warned about the studies linking the 
drug to SIDS.102 Indeed, after Brandy Foster’s death made him aware 
of the drug’s dangers, the doctor stopped prescribing the drug for 
children less than two years of age.103 
After his deposition, however, the doctor agreed to sign an 
affidavit in support of the brand-name manufacturer’s motion for 
summary judgment.104 In the affidavit, the doctor denied that he had 
 
 96. Id. at 6, 11–12. 
 97. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 37. 
 98. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 8–9. 
 99. Id. at 16; Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 32. 
 100. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 38. 
 101. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 15–16, 19–20. 
 102. Id. at 9, 15–17. 
 103. Id. at 17–18. 
 104. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (“With its 
motion Wyeth filed an affidavit signed by Dr. Berger stating that he prescribed Phenergan for 
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relied on any information from the manufacturer and instead stated 
that in prescribing the drug for the Foster children, he had “relied 
upon [his] many years of positive experience in using Phenergan to 
treat patients.”105 The doctor added that his decision to prescribe the 
drug was not influenced by the Physicians’ Desk Reference, and that 
he could not remember how long it had been since he had read that 
book’s entry on the drug.106 Although he had been visited periodically 
by the brand-name manufacturer’s sales representatives, he could not 
remember what they talked about with him, and their conversations 
did not influence his decision to prescribe the drug.107 Likewise, 
although he had seen numerous advertisements for the brand-name 
drug over the years, he could not remember much about their 
contents, and he had not relied on them in prescribing the drug.108 
The doctor’s affidavit did not directly contradict his deposition 
testimony, but it put a very different spin on the situation. The 
affidavit focused narrowly on the doctor’s specific thoughts at the 
moment he prescribed the drug for the Fosters’ children, whereas the 
deposition more broadly addressed the sources of information that, 
over time, had shaped the doctor’s perceptions of the drug, its safety, 
and its appropriate uses. 
The Fosters faced a devilish legal dilemma. Their doctor had 
prescribed a brand-name drug, but their pharmacist had given them a 
generic substitute made by another company. The doctor affirmed 
that he would not have prescribed the drug if he had been adequately 
warned about its dangers, and yet the doctor vowed that in 
prescribing the drug he had not relied on anything the drug 
companies had ever said about their products. One manufacturer was 
responsible for promoting the drug and crafting its allegedly 
inadequate warnings; another was responsible for actually concocting 
the syrup that Brandy received. And in the manufacturers’ view, this 
meant neither could be held legally responsible for her death. 
The Fosters ultimately were unable to prevail on any of their 
claims. Applying Maryland law, the trial judge threw out all but one 
of the claims against the brand-name manufacturer, concluding that 
 
Brandy based only on his own experience with the drug and did not rely on any representations 
made by Wyeth.”). 
 105. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 32–33. 
 106. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 9; Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant, supra note 92, at 32–33. 
 107. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 33. 
 108. Id. at 33, 37–38. 
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negligent misrepresentation was the only potentially viable cause of 
action against that defendant because the plaintiffs’ other claims were 
all products liability theories that could not be asserted against a 
company that did not manufacture or sell the drug that Brandy 
consumed.109 While discovery was underway, the Fosters voluntarily 
agreed to dismiss their suit against the generic drug manufacturer for 
reasons not revealed by the record,110 leaving their case focused 
entirely on their negligent misrepresentation claim against the brand-
name drug manufacturer. The trial judge soon tossed that claim as 
well, concluding that the Fosters could not prove that their doctor had 
relied on any misrepresentations made by the brand-name 
manufacturer.111 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the case, but rather than reach a narrow conclusion that 
the Fosters lacked sufficient evidence, the court issued a more 
sweeping pronouncement that a brand-name drug maker can never 
be liable for harm suffered by a person who takes a generic version of 
its drug.112 The court declared that products liability claims can only 
be brought against those who manufactured or sold the product that 
caused the injury in question, and that plaintiffs cannot circumvent 
that limitation by cloaking their case in the guise of a negligent 
misrepresentation theory.113 The court emphasized that the Fosters 
cited no previous cases in which a manufacturer had been held liable 
for injuries resulting from use of another manufacturer’s product.114 
This demonstrated nothing more than the novelty of the issue, for 
apparently neither the defendant nor the court had found any past 
decisions specifically rejecting claims like those asserted by the 
Fosters. The court nevertheless concluded that precedent was on the 
defendant’s side, citing irrelevant cases in which products liability 
claims failed because plaintiffs had no proof of any connection 
between the defendant and the plaintiff’s injuries.115 The Fourth 
 
 109. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167. The trial court thus rejected negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of warranty claims. Id. 
 110. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 11 n.8. The Fosters apparently did 
not sue their doctor. Id. 
 111. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168. 
 112. Id. at 168–72. 
 113. Id. at 168. 
 114. Id. at 170. 
 115. The Foster court cited Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and 
noted that the case held that Maryland does not recognize nonidentification theories such as 
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Circuit’s opinion went on to suggest a litany of other reasons why the 
brand-name manufacturer should not be held liable: a brand-name 
manufacturer has no relationship with those who take generic 
versions of its products;116 a brand-name manufacturer has no control 
over generic drug makers;117 and a brand-name manufacturer already 
bears the immense cost of developing and promoting new drugs, from 
which generic competitors then profit by copying.118 
In a curious bit of dicta, the court suggested that the generic drug 
maker, which was no longer a party in the case, could have been held 
liable for Brandy’s death,119 but the judges did not explore the 
ramifications of this suggestion. The court insisted that a generic drug 
company could be held liable for negligent misrepresentation even if 
all the statements it ever made about the drug were simply copied 
from the brand-name drug’s labeling.120 This observation, however, 
overlooked the more difficult issue of whether the generic drug 
manufacturer could be held liable even if the plaintiff’s doctor never 
looked at the generic drug’s labeling or received any other 
information from the generic drug maker. In other words, the Fourth 
Circuit judges felt that a generic manufacturer could not escape 
liability by pointing out that it did not write its own labeling. It is 
unclear what the court felt should happen when the generic 
manufacturer also asserts that nobody relied on its labeling. 
A decade after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the FDA 
announced that a boxed warning would be added to the drug to bar it 
 
market share liability. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168. The Foster court also cited Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1163–64 (4th Cir. 1986), and noted that the case rejected claims 
where the plaintiff could not prove who manufactured the asbestos that allegedly caused his 
injuries. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168. The irrelevance of these nonidentification or indeterminate 
tortfeasor scenarios is discussed in further detail below. See infra Part III.B. The Foster court 
also quoted some broad, general dicta from Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 437 A.2d 242 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), suggesting that every products liability claim requires “attribution of 
the defect to the seller” of the product. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168 (quoting Jensen, 437 A.2d at 247). 
The Jensen case had nothing to do with issues resembling those in the Foster case, and the dicta 
was based on authorities that likewise addressed unrelated issues. See Jensen, 437 A.2d at 247 
(citing Edward S. Digges, Jr., Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1977)). 
 116. Foster, 29 F.3d at 171. 
 117. Id. at 170. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 169–70. 
 120. Id. 
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from being given to children less than two years of age.121 A boxed 
warning, also known as a “black box warning,”122 is the strongest type 
of warning that the agency can require.123 The FDA called for adding 
this warning to promethazine after it reviewed reports it had been 
receiving since 1969 about children, like Brandy Foster, suffering 
respiratory depression and other serious adverse effects from taking 
the drug. The reports attributed the deaths of seven infants to the 
drug.124 
B. Case Law after Foster 
Foster proved to be an immensely valuable precedent for the 
drug industry. The Fourth Circuit’s position became the prevailing 
view as courts all over the country followed its reasoning in rejecting 
claims brought by plaintiffs who tried to sue brand-name drug 
manufacturers despite having taken generic equivalents.125 The judges 
 
 121. Peter R. Starke, Joyce Weaver & Badrul A. Chowdhury, Boxed Warning Added to 
Promethazine Labeling for Pediatric Use, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2653, 2653 (2005). 
 122. Raymond A. Mullady Jr., Everything You Needed and Wanted to Know About Black 
Box Warnings, 68 DEF. COUNSEL J. 50, 51 (2001). 
 123. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2010) (“Certain contraindications or serious warnings, 
particularly those that may lead to death or serious injury, may be required by the FDA to be 
presented in a box.”). 
 124. Starke et al., supra note 121, at 2653. 
 125. Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2008 WL 2677051, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 
2008); Pustejovsky v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-103-Y, 2008 WL 1314902, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
3, 2008); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Barnhill v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 06-0282-CB-M, 2007 WL 5787186, at *1 & n.2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007); 
Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:04-CV-1477, 2006 WL 2038436, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006); 
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 538–43 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); Possa v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., No. 05-1307-JJB-SCR, 2006 WL 6393160, at *1 (M.D. La. May 10, 2006); Tarver v. 
Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3-04-2036, 2006 WL 1517546, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Jan. 26, 2006); Tarver v. 
Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3-04-2036, 2005 WL 4052382, at *2–3 (W.D. La. June 7, 2005); Sheeks v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 15, 2004); Doe v. 
Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626–30 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Murphy v. 
Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Block v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 
Civ.A.3:02-CV-1077, 2003 WL 203067, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2003); Beutella v. A.H. 
Robins Co., No. 980502372, 2001 WL 35669202, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 10, 2001); Reynolds v. 
Anton, No. 01A-76719-3, slip op. at 14 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004), 2004 WL 5000272; Stanley 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34–35 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Kelly v. Wyeth, No. 
Civ.A.MICV200303314B, 2005 WL 4056740, at *2–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 6, 2005); Sloan v. 
Wyeth, No. MRS-L-1183-04, slip op. at 2–5, 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2004), 2004 WL 
5767103; cf. DaCosta v. Novartis AG, No. CV 01-800-BR, 2002 WL 31957424, at *9 (D. Or. 
Mar. 1, 2002) (holding that an individual sales representative of a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
could not be held liable when he did not promote the particular drug taken by the plaintiff); 
Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350–52 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting 
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in these cases did not seem to regard the issue as a close one. An 
appellate court in Florida, for example, rejected a plaintiff’s claims 
against a brand-name drug manufacturer with an opinion consisting 
of nothing more than a citation of the Foster case.126 
A few judges challenged the orthodox view, but their rulings 
could be brushed aside as minor deviations from the otherwise 
unanimous national consensus on the issue. For example, in Easter v. 
Aventis Pasteur, Inc.,127 a federal judge in Texas held that the original 
designer of a pharmaceutical product could be held liable for harm 
resulting from a patient’s use of other manufacturers’ versions of the 
same product.128 The case concerned a child allegedly exposed to 
harmful levels of mercury contained in thimerosal, a preservative 
used in pediatric vaccines.129 The child’s mother sued Eli Lilly & Co., 
even though that company had not manufactured the thimerosal in 
the vaccines received by her child.130 The mother alleged that “for 
many years, Lilly, as the original designer of thimerosal, distorted 
published medical literature and deceived health regulators and 
physicians about the safety of thimerosal,”131 and that thimerosal had 
become a widely used product because doctors, government 
regulators, and other manufacturers had relied on Lilly’s 
misrepresentations.132 Although Lilly insisted that it could not be held 
liable for harm suffered via use of products it played no part in 
manufacturing, the court held that Lilly knew other manufacturers 
had copied its design, was in the best position to know about the 
potential hazards of that design, and thus had a duty to warn about 
those risks.133 
 
misrepresentation claims against a brand-name drug manufacturer on the alternative grounds 
that federal law preempted the claims and that the manufacturer could not be liable for injuries 
suffered by a patient who consumed a generic version of the drug). 
 126. Sharp v. Leichus, 952 So. 2d 555, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), aff’g No. 2004-CA-
0643, 2006 WL 515532 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006). 
 127. Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 5:03-CV-141(TJW), 2004 WL 3104610 (E.D. Tex. 
Feb. 11, 2004). 
 128. Id. at *10. 
 129. Id. at *1. 
 130. Id. at *2, 8. 
 131. Id. at *8. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *9. 
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A few years later, in Clark v. Pfizer Inc.,134 a Pennsylvania trial 
court reached a similar conclusion in a case that involved only 
economic harm, not personal physical injuries.135 The case concerned 
a drug approved by the FDA for treatment of epilepsy and 
neuralgia.136 The plaintiffs accused the drug’s brand-name 
manufacturer of illegally promoting the drug for other, unapproved 
uses.137 The suit was brought as a class action on behalf of everyone 
who had purchased the drug, in its brand-name or generic form, with 
prescriptions written for off-label uses.138 The plaintiffs did not claim 
to have been physically harmed by taking the drug; they simply 
sought refunds of the money they paid for it.139 Insisting that it had no 
duty to consumers who purchased other companies’ products, the 
brand-name manufacturer sought summary judgment on the claims of 
all class members who received the generic rather than the brand-
name version of the drug.140 The trial judge denied the motion, 
rejecting the argument that a brand-name manufacturer has no duty 
to those who receive the generic version of its product.141 The judge 
reasoned that if the brand-name manufacturer fraudulently 
encouraged doctors to believe the drug was suitable for nonapproved 
uses, some patients would wind up receiving the generic drug for 
those off-label uses.142 The judge thus saw no reason to draw a 
distinction between patients who took the generic drug and those who 
took the brand-name product, because all were harmed in equally 
foreseeable ways by the brand-name manufacturer’s wrongdoing.143 
 
 134. Clark v. Pfizer Inc., No. 1819, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 74 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 
14, 2008). 
 135. Id. at *30–32. 
 136. Id. at *1. 
 137. Id. at *2. Indeed, as part of a plea agreement to a criminal charge, one of the drug’s 
manufacturers had agreed to pay a $240 million fine and to stop promoting the drug for off-label 
use. Id. 
 138. Id. at *1. 
 139. See id. at *30 (discussing the validity of plaintiffs’ “claims for reimbursement of sums 
spent”). 
 140. Id. at *1. 
 141. See id. at *28–30 (applying a five-factor test to determine that the brand-name 
manufacturer owed a duty to those who received the generic version of the drug). The judge, 
however, ruled that the manufacturer could not be held liable for breach of warranty to those 
who did not purchase its product. Id. at *1, *31. 
 142. Id. at *21–22. 
 143. Much of the brand-name manufacturer’s alleged wrongdoing in the Clark case occurred 
while the brand-name drug was still under patent protection and no generic version of the drug 
was even available. Id. at *19–20. This did not deter the judge from ruling that the brand-name 
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The Clark ruling thus made another small dent in the line of 
precedent after Foster, but it drew little attention.144 The California 
Court of Appeal was, however, about to deliver a more significant 
blow. 
C. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. 
Elizabeth Conte was about sixty years old when she began to 
experience problems with food from her stomach backing up into her 
throat.145 After about a month of discomfort from this condition, 
commonly known as heartburn or acid reflux,146 Conte saw a doctor 
about the problem.147 She then began taking metoclopramide,148 a 
prescription drug manufactured and sold by Wyeth, Inc. under the 
brand name Reglan but also produced by a number of generic 
manufacturers.149 The drug essentially blocks reception of certain 
neurotransmitters, thereby stimulating gastrointestinal nerves and 
muscles to make the stomach empty more rapidly into the 
intestines.150 
In 2003, about three years after she started taking the drug, 
Conte began to experience mild involuntary movements of her 
mouth.151 The condition soon worsened, with the uncontrollable 
movements of her mouth and tongue becoming more severe.152 
Conte’s toes began to move involuntarily as well.153 Conte saw a 
neurologist who determined that she was suffering from a 
neurological disorder known as tardive dyskinesia, caused by her 
 
manufacturer might be liable to those who eventually took the generic drug because the brand-
name manufacturer could easily foresee that generic versions of the drug would become 
available as soon as the brand-name drug’s patent expired. Id. at *21–22. 
 144. The judge later decertified the plaintiff class. Clark v. Pfizer Inc., No. 1819, 2009 WL 
1725953, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 20, 2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 990 A.2d 17 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010). 
 145. See Respondent Wyeth’s Brief at 4, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (Nos. A116707, A117353), 2008 WL 684752. 
 146. See generally John F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Esophageal and Supraesophageal 
Reflux Injuries, 108 AM. J. MED. 99S, 99S (Supp. 4A 2000) (equating individuals suffering from 
“symptoms of heartburn” with people suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease). 
 147. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 4. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1. 
 150. See Reglan, RXLIST, http://www.rxlist.com/reglan-drug.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 151. Complaint for Damages ¶ 20, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CGC-04-437382 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 2, 2005), 2005 WL 5168019. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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long-term use of metoclopramide to treat her heartburn symptoms.154 
Tardive dyskinesia produces persistent, repetitive involuntary 
movements, particularly in the muscles of the lower face. These 
movements, including facial grimacing and tongue thrusting, “are 
often severe, distressing, and incapacitating,”155 and may lead to life-
threatening respiratory difficulties.156 No cure exists for tardive 
dyskinesia, and little can be done to treat the condition once it has 
begun.157 
Conte filed a lawsuit against her doctor, the manufacturer of the 
brand-name drug, and three companies that produced the drug in 
generic form.158 She acknowledged that she consumed only the 
generic versions of the drug.159 
Significant confusion soon arose about the facts surrounding 
Conte’s prescriptions for the drug. Conte alleged that she took the 
drug, which her gastroenterologist prescribed, from about August 
2000 until about April 2004.160 The doctor, however, denied that he 
had ever prescribed the drug for Conte.161 Pharmacy records seemed 
to show otherwise, indicating that Conte had received the drug, 
pursuant to prescriptions from the doctor, for at least two years.162 
Moreover, the doctor’s assistant testified that she authorized a 
pharmacy to refill Conte’s prescription on some occasions.163 
Given that such confusion existed about the simple issue of 
whether Conte even received a prescription, it is not surprising that 
the evidence was also unclear on the more complex question of why 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. M. L’E. Orme & R.C. Tallis, Metoclopramide and Tardive Dyskinesia in the Elderly, 
289 BRIT. MED. J. 397, 398 (1984). 
 156. M. Reza Samie, Mary Anne Dannenhoffer & Susan Rozek, Life-Threatening Tardive 
Dyskinesia Caused by Metoclopramide, 2 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 125, 125 (1987). 
 157. Orme & Tallis, supra note 155, at 398. 
 158. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 2–14. The brand-name drug was initially 
produced by A.H. Robins Co., which was later acquired by Wyeth. Brief of Appellant, supra 
note 33, at 2 n.1. In 2001, during the period when Conte was taking the drug, Wyeth sold the 
rights to produce the brand-name product to another company, Schwarz Pharma, Inc. Id. at 3 
n.1. Conte therefore asserted claims against both Wyeth and Schwarz Pharma as producers of 
the brand-name drug. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 2–4. For simplicity’s sake, 
this Article will discuss the situation as though there was only one brand-name manufacturer of 
the drug; that there were actually two does not affect the analysis. 
 159. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 160. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 17, 19. 
 161. Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9. 
 162. Id. at 8–9, 9 n.6. 
 163. Id. at 9. 
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Conte’s doctor prescribed the drug for her. Conte claimed that the 
doctor relied on information that the brand-name manufacturer 
disseminated through the Physicians’ Desk Reference.164 In his 
deposition, the doctor acknowledged that he probably had read the 
information about the drug in that book at some point during the 
residency period at the beginning of his medical career, that he 
believed the information he had read was accurate, and that the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference generally was one of the sources he would 
refer to in prescribing Reglan for his patients.165 The brand-name 
manufacturer, however, was able to obtain an affidavit from the 
doctor stating that he did not rely on the Physicians’ Desk Reference 
or any other information from the brand-name manufacturer in 
deciding on a course of treatment for Conte.166 It is hard to know what 
to make of the affidavit, given that the doctor denied even having 
prescribed the drug. In any event, whatever the doctor knew about 
the drug appeared to have come from the brand-name manufacturer 
and not the generic producers. Conte conceded that there was no 
evidence the doctor ever saw the generic products’ labeling or any 
other information generated by the generic manufacturers.167 
Whether the drug’s labeling contained adequate warnings about 
the risk of tardive dyskinesia was another hotly disputed issue in the 
case. As early as 1978, articles in medical journals had raised concerns 
about a link between metoclopramide and tardive dyskinesia.168 The 
evidence of an association between the drug and this disorder quickly 
accumulated,169 and in 1985 the FDA required manufacturers of 
 
 164. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307–08; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9. 
 165. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308 & n.6; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9; 
Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 28. 
 166. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9; Respondent 
Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 28. 
 167. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 10. 
 168. See M. Kataria, M. Traub & C.D. Marsden, Extrapyramidal Side-Effects of 
Metoclopramide, 312 LANCET 1254, 1254 (1978) (“Metoclopramide has been associated with 
chronic tardive dyskinesia . . . .”); S. Lavy, E. Melamed & S. Penchas, Tardive Dyskinesia 
Associated with Metoclopramide, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 61, 77 (1978) (“Recently, acute facial 
dyskinesias .  .  . have been reported .  .  . shortly after administration of low doses of 
metoclopramide.”); see also S. Melmed & H. Bank, Metoclopramide and Facial Dyskinesia, 1 
BRIT. MED. J. 293, 331 (1975) (reporting two cases of acute or short-term episodes of facial 
dyskinesia by patients taking metoclopramide, but noting that they “seem to be unique and may 
signify an individual sensitivity to the drug”). 
 169. See, e.g., J. David Grimes, Parkinsonism and Tardive Dyskinesia Associated with Long-
Term Metoclopramide Therapy, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1417, 1417 (1981) (noting that 
“metoclopramide-induced parkinsonism and tardive dyskinesia have become frequent 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
2011] TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1153 
metoclopramide to add a warning to the drug’s labeling about this 
risk.170 The warning stated that the drug was to be used as “short-term 
(4 to 12 weeks) therapy” for patients whose acid reflux failed to 
respond to other treatments, and that use for periods longer than 
twelve weeks “has not been evaluated and cannot be 
recommended.”171 The labeling noted that “approximately 1 in 500 
patients” showed symptoms of neurological movement disorders 
within a short time after beginning to take the drug.172 It went on to 
warn that the drug could cause tardive dyskinesia, particularly among 
elderly women, and that “[b]oth the risk of developing the syndrome 
and the likelihood that it will become irreversible are believed to 
increase with the duration of treatment and the total cumulative 
dose.”173 
According to the drug’s manufacturers, these warnings sufficed 
to apprise doctors of the risk of tardive dyskinesia from long-term use 
of metoclopramide.174 Many plaintiffs like Conte have argued 
otherwise, pointing out that studies actually suggested the risk of 
developing tardive dyskinesia from long-term use of the drug might 
be more than one hundred times greater than the one-in-five-hundred 
figure mentioned on the drug’s labeling.175 Although the label 
specified that the one-in-five-hundred statistic was for short-term use 
and that the risk for long-term users was believed to be higher, 
mentioning the low number and then merely saying that the odds 
 
diagnoses”); J. David Grimes, Mohamed N. Hassan & David N. Preston, Adverse Neurologic 
Effects of Metoclopramide, 126 CAN. MED. ASS’N J., 23, 23 (1982) (noting “a frequent 
association between the long-term use of metoclopramide and a parkinsonian syndrome that 
was often followed by tardive dyskinesia”); Norman A. Leopold, Prolonged Metoclopramide-
Induced Dyskinetic Reaction, 34 NEUROLOGY 238, 238 (1984) (“A prolonged acute dyskinetic 
reaction due to metoclopramide . . . is herein described.”). 
 170. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1501). 
 171. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2714–15 (55th ed. 2001). 
 172. Id. at 2714. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 369–72 (5th Cir. 2006) (reviewing and rejecting 
the manufacturer’s argument that its warnings about tardive dsykinesia were adequate). 
 175. See Linda Ganzini, Daniel E. Casey, William F. Hoffman & Anthony L. McCall, The 
Prevalence of Metoclopramide-Induced Tardive Dyskinesia and Acute Extrapyramidal 
Movement Disorders, 153 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1469, 1469 (1993) (“Metoclopramide use is 
associated with a significantly increased prevalence and severity of several extrapyramidal 
movement disorders.”); Daniel D. Sewell, Angela B. Kodsi, Michael P. Caligiuri & Dilip V. 
Jeste, Metoclopramide and Tardive Dyskinesia, 36 BIOL. PSYCH. 630, 631 (1994) (finding “that 
[metoclopramide]-associated [tardive dyskinesia] may be frequent, mild to moderate in severity, 
and persistent”). 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
1154 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1123 
might be higher for long-term users “does not put a physician on 
notice that the increase in risk is of a completely different order of 
magnitude” and therefore could be considered misleading and 
inadequate.176 Moreover, plaintiffs like Conte also pointed to evidence 
showing that drug makers knew that doctors routinely continued to 
prescribe the drug for long-term use despite the label’s statement that 
it was not recommended for use beyond twelve weeks.177 
The drug companies in Conte’s case did not want to face a jury 
on those issues. They therefore took the position that even if the 
drug’s labeling was inadequate, no manufacturer could be held 
responsible because Conte’s doctor obtained information about the 
drug only from the brand-name manufacturer, whereas Conte’s 
pharmacist gave her only the generic versions of the drug.178 Conte 
thus found herself in the same dilemma that had snared the Fosters 
and many other plaintiffs in previous cases. 
The trial court dismissed all of Conte’s claims against the drug 
makers. On appeal, she faced the solid wall of precedent following 
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Foster and rejecting the idea that a 
brand-name drug manufacturer could be liable for harm suffered by 
those taking generic equivalents of its product.179 
The California Court of Appeal, however, fired a forceful shot at 
that wall by ruling in favor of Conte on her claims against the brand-
name manufacturer.180 The court began by recognizing that a genuine 
factual dispute existed about whether Conte’s doctor had relied on 
 
 176. McNeil, 462 F.3d at 370; see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 7 (“The 
information disseminated by Wyeth and the generic defendants, whether through the PDR, in 
metoclopramide package inserts, or otherwise, was materially false, incomplete, and/or 
misleading . . . .”). 
 177. See McNeil, 462 F.3d at 369 (stating that the drug maker’s market data indicated an 84 
percent rate of long-term use); Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 7 (noting the drug maker’s 
internal data and access to independent studies); R.B. Stewart, Metoclopramide: An Analysis of 
Inappropriate Long-Term Use in the Elderly, 26 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 977, 977–78 
(1992) (demonstrating that 32.4 percent of surveyed metoclopramide patients had been using it 
for over one year). 
 178. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 305–06 (Ct. App. 2008). The generic 
manufacturers also argued that federal law preempted the claims against them. Id. Indeed, only 
one of the generic manufacturers actually pressed the argument about not having supplied 
information to Conte’s doctor, although that argument turned out to be the means by which all 
three ultimately escaped liability for Conte’s injuries. Id. at 318–20. 
 179. See supra Part II.B. 
 180. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 309–18. 
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Wyeth’s alleged misrepresentations about its product.181 The court 
then held that although Conte could have strict products liability 
claims only against those who manufactured or sold the product she 
consumed, no similar limit applied to a negligent misrepresentation 
claim.182 The court further found that the brand-name manufacturer 
owed a duty to Conte because it was foreseeable that the generic drug 
makers would copy the brand-name drug’s labeling and that 
pharmacists would fill prescriptions for brand-name drugs with their 
generic equivalents.183 Concluding that the brand-name manufacturer 
therefore should not be able to avoid responsibility to someone like 
Conte who fortuitously happened to receive the generic drug, the 
court emphasized that its decision was “rooted in common sense and 
California common law” and was “not marking out new territory.”184 
Although ruling against the brand-name drug manufacturer, the 
California Court of Appeal went the other way on Conte’s claims 
against the generic drug makers.185 The court noted that although 
Conte took the generic versions of the drug, she had no evidence that 
her doctor ever read or relied upon any labeling or other information 
generated by the generic drug manufacturers.186 Even if the generic 
drug makers’ warnings were inadequate, the court reasoned, they 
could not be the cause of Conte’s injuries if her doctor never looked 
at them.187 The court therefore concluded that Conte could proceed 
with her claims against the brand-name manufacturer but not the 
generic drug producers. The decision was an odd converse of the 
result in Foster, in which the Fourth Circuit rejected the claims 
against the brand-name manufacturer but suggested the generic 
producer should have been held liable.188 
In one respect, however, the Conte and Foster cases had parallel 
outcomes. In early 2009, the FDA ordered manufacturers of 
metoclopramide, the drug taken by Elizabeth Conte, to start putting a 
 
 181. Id. at 308 (“[T]here are disputed factual issues as to both the accuracy of Dr. Elsen’s 
recollection and, even if he did not specifically refer to the PDR when he formulated Conte’s 
treatment, whether information he had previously garnered from the PDR was a substantial 
factor in his decision to prescribe Reglan for her.”). 
 182. Id. at 309–11. 
 183. Id. at 311–13. 
 184. Id. at 311. 
 185. Id. at 318–20. 
 186. Id. at 318. 
 187. Id. at 319. 
 188. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
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black box warning at the top of their labeling, emphasizing the risk of 
tardive dyskinesia and advising against long-term use.189 The FDA 
found that, despite the weaker warnings previously given, many 
doctors were still prescribing the drug for periods longer than three 
months, and that metoclopramide had become the nation’s leading 
cause of drug-induced movement disorders.190 The FDA’s action, like 
its similar move to require a black box warning about the drug 
involved in Foster,191 underscores that the plaintiffs in these cases 
raised genuinely serious questions about the adequacy of the 
warnings being given by the drug companies. 
D. The Reaction to Conte 
The California Court of Appeal’s decision in Conte immediately 
drew scathing criticism from commentators. An influential blog on 
legal issues relating to pharmaceutical companies declared that Conte 
“effectively stands product liability law on its head.”192 Others 
similarly expressed surprise at the California court’s decision, calling 
it a “stunning”193 and “remarkable”194 decision that “sen[t] the 
pharmaceutical defense bar reeling.”195 
Given that it involved a significant issue of first impression in the 
state and reached conclusions that differed from most precedent in 
other jurisdictions, the Conte decision seemed to be a likely candidate 
for review by the Supreme Court of California. A slew of amicus 
filings asked the Supreme Court of California to hear the case and to 
 
 189. See Elizabeth Mechcatie, Stronger Warning on Dyskinesia Risk Required for 
Metoclopramide, CLINICAL NEUROLOGY NEWS, May/June 2009, at 14, 14 (“The chronic use of 
metoclopramide therapy should be avoided in all but rare cases . . . .” (quoting Dr. Janet 
Woodcock, Director, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research)). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 192. James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Generic Drug—Pioneer Liability, DRUG & DEVICE 
L. (Nov. 7, 2008, 4:10 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/11/generic-drug-pioneer-
liabilty.html. 
 193. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Brand Name Manufacturer Liable for Generics Made by 
Competitor, TORTSPROF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2008, 11:17 AM), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
tortsprof/2008/week46/index.html. 
 194. James R. Phelps, Am I My (Generic) Brother’s Keeper? In California, Yes., FDA L. 
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2008/11/am-i-
my-generic-brothers-keeper-in-california-yes.html. 
 195. Melissa Maleske, Brand-Name Burdens: California Decision on Generic Drug Liability 
Upends 14 Years of Precedent, INSIDE COUNSEL, Feb. 2009, at 20, 20. 
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reverse the lower court’s ruling.196 The California high court 
nevertheless declined to review the matter, clearing the way for the 
case to return to the trial court and work its way toward a trial.197 
The Conte case thus created a distinct split of judicial authority. 
In the years since the Conte decision, a multitude of other courts that 
have faced the issue have followed Foster and rejected Conte’s 
conclusion that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable to a 
patient who took the generic version of the drug.198 To the extent 
these courts have mentioned Conte, they have dismissed it as “the 
lone outlier against the overwhelming weight of authority on this 
point.”199 The Conte decision also continues to be roundly condemned 
by defense lawyers and other commentators. Conte is an 
 
 196. The organizations filing briefs in support of the brand-name drug manufacturer 
included the California Health Institute, the California Manufacturers & Technology 
Association, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America, and the Product Liability Advisory Council. More complete information about the 
amicus filings can be found in the docket for the Conte case. Docket (Register of Actions): Conte 
v. Wyeth Inc. et al., CAL. APPELLATE CTS.: CASE INFO., http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/
search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=1&doc_id=534293&doc_no=A117353 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 197. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. S169116, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 233, at *1 (Cal. Jan. 21, 2009). 
 198. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 612–14 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3522, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 
3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-993), and Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3523, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1039); 
Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 10-CV-00110-AW, 2010 WL 4485774, at *2–3 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2010); 
Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2010 WL 3632747, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 
2010); Johnson v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:10 CV 404, 2010 WL 3271934, at *3 (W.D. La. 
Aug. 16, 2010); Fisher v. Pelstring, No. 4:09-cv-00252-TLW, 2010 WL 2998474, at *6 (D.S.C. July 
28, 2010); Neal v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 09-CV-1027, 2010 WL 2640170, at *2 (W.D. Ark. 
July 1, 2010); Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0284-KD-C, 2010 WL 2594000, *6 (S.D. Ala. June 
28, 2010); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 2010 WL 2553619, at *2–3 (D. Or. May 28, 
2010); Craig v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:10-00227, 2010 WL 2649545, at *4 (W.D. La. May 26, 2010); 
Finnicum v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-785, 2010 WL 1718204, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2010); 
Howe v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-610-T-17AEP, 2010 WL 1708857, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 
2010); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 646 (W.D.N.C. 2010); Hardy v. Wyeth, Inc., 
No. 9:09CV152, 2010 WL 1049588, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2010); Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F. 
Supp. 2d 1338, 1343–45 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0854, 2009 WL 4064103, 
at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 23, 2009); Meade v. Parsley, No. 2:09-cv-00388, 2009 WL 3806716, at *2–3 
(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 13, 2009); Burke v. Wyeth, Inc., No. G-09-82, 2009 WL 3698480, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 29, 2009); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D.N.C. 2009); Fields v. 
Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-
00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 
F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266–67 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Cousins v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0310-
N, 2009 WL 648703, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2009). 
 199. Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586 XXX MB, slip op. at 10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 21, 2009), 2009 WL 4924722. 
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“aberration,” its critics argue, “which belies the policy and precedent 
of products-liability law.”200 
The California Court of Appeal does not stand completely alone, 
however, for a federal district court judge in Vermont has joined it in 
recognizing that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable for 
injuries caused by the generic version of its drug.201 After discussing 
the Foster and Conte precedents and acknowledging that they might 
provide helpful insights, the federal court undertook a careful analysis 
of Vermont tort law and concluded that “[t]here is no reason, under 
Vermont law, to limit [a brand-name manufacturer’s] duty of care to 
physicians by the pharmacist’s choice of a generic bioequivalent drug 
to fill the physician’s prescription.”202 The federal court’s ruling 
suggests that Conte ultimately may turn out to be more influential 
and less of an aberrational outlier than its critics expected. 
III.  ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT BRAND-NAME 
MANUFACTURERS’ LIABILITY FOR GENERIC DRUG INJURIES 
In turning to the many arguments presented on both sides of the 
issue, there are some initial areas of basic confusion that have clouded 
 
 200. Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 11, at 789. 
 201. Kellogg v. Wyeth, No. 2:07-cv-00082, slip op. at 19–34 (D. Vt. Oct. 20, 2010). 
 202. Id. at 31. Prior to the court’s ruling in Kellogg, the plaintiff submitted to the court a 
copy of a pre-publication draft of this Article, and the court ordered the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs addressing it. The Kellogg plaintiff suggested that the Article makes 
“substantial and positive contributions to the understanding of these cases and the issues 
presented in them,” but “miss[es] the mark” in many ways, particularly with respect to the role 
of causation and reliance in misrepresentation claims versus failure to warn claims. Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum Concerning Pertinent Aspects of the Rostron Article at 2, Kellogg, No. 2:07-cv-
00082. In addition, preferring a simple rule of joint and several liability for all defendants 
responsible for an injury, the plaintiff objected to this Article’s proposed framework for 
allocating liability between brand-name and generic manufacturers. Id. at 12–14; see also infra 
Part IV.B. On the other hand, the brand-name manufacturer in Kellogg characterized the 
Article as being concerned primarily with situations where a plaintiff who took a generic drug 
would be left with no remedy whatsoever if the drug’s brand-name manufacturer escaped 
liability. Wyeth’s Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 1–3, Kellogg, No. 2:07-cv-00082. The manufacturer argued that no need existed for 
adopting the Article’s “novel theories” in a case where the plaintiff might have viable claims 
against generic drug manufacturers and against her doctor. Id. at 4–5. In fact, situations where 
an injured plaintiff would have no tort remedies against anyone illustrate most starkly the 
unfairness of letting brand-name manufacturers avoid responsibility for harm caused by their 
negligence, but the unfairness is by no means limited to those situations. Despite giving careful 
consideration to both parties’ assessments, I was not moved by their critiques. Indeed, taking 
fire from both sides encouraged me to hope that the approach proposed in this Article balances 
well the competing interests at stake. 
ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/14/2011  1:00:36 PM 
2011] TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1159 
the question and often have prevented litigants, courts, and 
commentators from zeroing in on equitable and policy considerations 
that should be the focal points of the debate. Clearing away these 
preliminary sources of confusion will not resolve the ultimate issue 
under consideration here, but it will set the stage for a more lucid and 
productive discussion. After trying to shed light on the matters that 
have distracted and misled analyses in the past, I turn to the equity 
and policy considerations that should drive efforts to develop 
approaches fair to injured plaintiffs, brand-name manufacturers, and 
generic drug makers. 
A. Negligence versus Strict Liability Claims 
Determining the proper scope of drug companies’ liability 
requires careful attention to distinctions among the several different 
causes of action that can be asserted in products liability cases. 
Products liability is a broad term that covers an entire field of law 
containing several different types of claims and legal theories.203 Some 
products liability claims require proof that the defendant was 
negligent, but others, like strict tort liability and breach of warranty, 
do not necessarily require any proof of fault.204 Those “untutored in 
the finer points of products liability law sometimes casually 
interchange the terms ‘strict liability’ and ‘products liability,’” but 
“[s]uch usage is imprecise and should be avoided, because it equates a 
single theory of liability with an entire field of law.”205 
Drug manufacturers and other critics of Conte often have failed 
to fully respect these crucial distinctions. They point to judicial 
decisions that discuss the purposes and limits of strict liability claims 
but misread the decisions as addressing all tort claims, even those not 
involving any form of strict liability.206 For example, when the 
Supreme Court of California first ruled in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.207 that strict tort liability should be imposed on 
manufacturers of defective products, it stated that “[t]he purpose of 
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
 
 203. See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 205. OWEN, supra note 60, § 5.1, at 254. 
 206. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 310–11 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting the 
brand-name drug manufacturer’s misplaced reliance on numerous strict tort liability cases). 
 207. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
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products on the market.”208 Critics of the Conte decision contend that 
this is the “bedrock rationale for product liability” and that Conte 
contradicts it.209 The court in Greenman, however, made very clear 
that it was talking about strict tort liability, not all tort claims or even 
all products liability claims.210 To contend otherwise, critics of Conte 
have engaged in a subtle sleight of hand that improperly equates strict 
liability with products liability and stretches these terms to cover 
negligence and all other tort claims that could ever be brought against 
manufacturers. 
Although Greenman and countless other cases established that 
strict liability applies only to the manufacturer and other sellers that 
put the allegedly defective product on the market,211 Conte does not 
undercut or contradict that proposition in any way. Indeed, the Conte 
decision did not say anything whatsoever about expanding the reach 
of strict liability. It instead specifically emphasized that strict liability 
cannot apply to a brand-name manufacturer when the plaintiff took a 
generic drug made by another company.212 At the same time, the court 
recognized that “[n]egligence and strict products liability are separate 
and distinct bases for liability” and that they “do not automatically 
collapse into each other” merely because there are some situations in 
which a plaintiff might be able to assert both types of claims.213 
Strict liability is unusual. Tort law generally imposes liability only 
on those who were at fault, either through negligence or intentional 
wrongdoing.214 Strict liability is thus a rare and exceptional condition, 
whereas being liable for injuries caused by one’s negligence is the 
norm. The limits on the reach of strict liability claims should be 
carefully respected, but when a situation is outside those limits, it 
does not fall into some sort of bizarre twilight zone in which 
defendants have immunity from all liability. Instead, the normal rules 
of tort law apply, including the principles providing that defendants 
 
 208. Id. at 901. 
 209. E.g., James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, More Thoughts on Conte v. Wyeth, DRUG & 
DEVICE L. (Nov. 13, 2008, 4:52 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/11/more-
thoughts-on-conte-v-wyeth.html. 
 210. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
 211. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 311 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he defendant 
would not be liable in strict products liability because it did not manufacture or sell the 
product.”). 
 213. Id. at 310. 
 214. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 263–66 (2000). 
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who cause foreseeable harm through unreasonably careless behavior 
generally can be held liable for their negligence. Though a brand-
name drug manufacturer may not be held strictly liable for harm to 
patients who took its product’s generic counterpart, the 
manufacturer’s potential liability for negligence is a separate matter 
that must be resolved through careful analysis. 
B. Indeterminate Tortfeasor versus Additional Tortfeasor Scenarios 
The other major point of confusion that has plagued the debate 
over these issues is a failure to distinguish between two different 
types of situations in which a plaintiff might assert claims against 
more than one manufacturer. In some instances, a plaintiff sues 
multiple manufacturers simply because the true identity of a 
product’s manufacturer is in doubt. In other instances, the identity of 
the product’s manufacturer is well known, but the plaintiff sues 
multiple manufacturers because one engaged in some conduct, other 
than manufacturing the product, that was tortious and contributed to 
causing plaintiff’s injury. These two different situations have been 
continually conflated and confused with one another in the debate 
over brand-name and generic drug manufacturer liability. 
Consider a scenario that does not involve products. Suppose 
several people fired guns in a plaintiff’s direction, and the plaintiff 
wound up being struck by one bullet. To recover damages, the 
plaintiff would generally need to identify the person who shot her. 
The plaintiff would figure out whose bullet hit her, and then simply 
sue that person. If the plaintiff could not determine which person shot 
her, she might still be able to recover under one of several special tort 
theories. For example, if the people firing guns engaged in a 
concerted effort to harm the plaintiff, then all of them would be 
jointly liable for the harm no matter who fired the bullet that actually 
found its target.215 Even absent such concerted or joint action, the 
theory of alternative liability could enable the plaintiff to sue and to 
hold liable all who negligently fired the shots toward her.216 
 
 215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in 
concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him . . . .”). 
 216. Invented by the Supreme Court of California, alternative liability has been widely 
embraced by other courts. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3–5 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden 
of proof to the defendants and concluding that each defendant would be liable unless he is able 
to prove it was not his shot that caused the plaintiff’s injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (“Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved 
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Those situations in which the plaintiff cannot determine the 
identity of the person whose bullet struck her must be carefully 
distinguished from situations in which the plaintiff has no doubts 
about whose bullet hit her body, but she nevertheless has grounds for 
asserting tort claims against more than one person. Assume, for 
example, that the evidence makes clear that John fired the shot that 
hit the plaintiff. In addition to whatever claims she may have against 
John, the plaintiff may have claims against David as well if she can 
prove that David engaged in some sort of tortious conduct that was a 
cause of the injury. For example, if David should have known that 
John was mentally unstable and violent, but nevertheless gave him 
the gun used to shoot the plaintiff, David might be liable for negligent 
entrustment of the firearm.217 If David negligently mistook the 
plaintiff for a deer and then convinced John to shoot in the plaintiff’s 
direction, David could be liable even though he did not fire the bullet 
that hit the plaintiff.218 Likewise, if David negligently told the plaintiff 
that it was safe to enter a spot at which David knew or had reason to 
know that bullets would be flying, David could be liable.219 David 
similarly might be liable if his negligent operation of a shooting range 
led the plaintiff to be hit by a bullet fired by John,220 if he negligently 
published a book that advised John on how to shoot the plaintiff,221 or 
if he negligently supplied a faulty bulletproof vest to the plaintiff.222 In 
these and an endless variety of other imaginable scenarios, David 
might be held liable for his negligence, despite the fact that he did not 
 
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to 
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the 
harm.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1208 (Fla. 1997) (holding that a 
negligent entrustment action is proper when a person provides a firearm to an intoxicated 
person); Estate of Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 271 (Ind. 2003) (articulating a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the storage of a firearm to prevent access and use by a third 
party). 
 218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311(1) (1965) (“One who negligently gives 
false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by 
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information . . . .”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Dionne v. City of Trenton, 261 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). 
 221. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the 
publisher of an instructional book used by a hit man to plan a contract killing could be “civilly 
liable for aiding and abetting” the murder). 
 222. See House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 348 (Utah 1996) (finding a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the manufacturer and the distributor of body armor owed 
the plaintiff, a SWAT team officer, a duty to warn him of the limitations of their product). 
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fire the bullet that struck the plaintiff. David’s liability in these 
scenarios does not depend on any of the special theories, like 
alternative liability, that apply in situations in which the plaintiff is 
unable to determine who shot her. Those theories are irrelevant when 
it is clear that David is not the one who shot the plaintiff, but the 
plaintiff nevertheless sues David for some other tortious conduct that 
contributed to her injury. 
The same logic applies when the plaintiff suffered harm from use 
of a drug or other product. In some instances, the plaintiff may not be 
able to determine which of several manufacturers produced the 
particular dose she received. In those situations, the plaintiff will need 
to invoke one of the special tort theories—concert of action, 
alternative liability, enterprise liability, or market share liability—that 
might overcome her inability to identify the product’s manufacturer.223 
The availability of those theories should be irrelevant, however, when 
the plaintiff can identify the product’s manufacturer but nevertheless 
has claims against some other manufacturer who engaged in some 
other tortious conduct that was also a cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In 
other words, a manufacturer could be sued not because it made or 
might have made the product in question but because it was simply an 
additional tortfeasor liable for some form of wrongdoing other than 
making and selling the product the plaintiff received. 
The distinction between an indeterminate manufacturer and an 
additional tortfeasor seems simple. Yet defendants and judges have 
often blurred and confused the two in cases about the liability of 
brand-name and generic drug makers. The trouble dates all the way 
back to the Foster case, in which the brand-name manufacturer’s 
arguments focused heavily on the unavailability of nonidentification 
theories, such as alternative liability and market share liability, that 
 
 223. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 11.3, at 782–90 (defining market share liability, alternative 
liability, enterprise liability, and concert-of-action liability). Each of these four theories has been 
applied to product manufacturers. See Dawson v. Bristol Labs., 658 F. Supp. 1036, 1038–40 
(W.D. Ky. 1987) (discussing concert of action and finding that the plaintiff had stated a valid 
claim under a concert-of-action theory); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 
353, 376–78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explaining the rationale underlying enterprise liability and 
allowing the plaintiff’s action to proceed under that theory); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 
924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that under market share liability, “[e]ach defendant will be held 
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it 
demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries”); 
Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 473 N.E.2d 1199, 1200 (Ohio 1984) (endorsing the doctrine of 
alternative liability found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)). 
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were irrelevant to the case.224 Biting into the red herring offered by 
the drug manufacturer, the Fourth Circuit similarly emphasized the 
unavailability of those theories and failed to confront squarely the 
idea that the brand-name manufacturer could be liable as an 
additional tortfeasor even though it did not make the drug that killed 
Brandy Foster.225 Throughout the long line of precedent that flowed 
out of Foster, courts have repeatedly made the same mistake, 
dwelling on the irrelevant concept of liability being imposed on 
multiple manufacturers because of uncertainty about who made a 
product and conflating that concept with the separate and distinct 
issue of whether a manufacturer can be liable for wrongdoing other 
than making and selling the product the plaintiff received.226 
The indeterminate manufacturer and additional tortfeasor 
scenarios implicate fundamentally different concerns. The former 
raises important questions about the appropriate judicial response to 
the inevitability of factual uncertainty in the world,227 whereas the 
latter often presents equally profound—but very different—questions 
about the complex web of causal factors underlying events, the nature 
and degree of connection courts should demand between a 
defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s injury, and the proper scope or 
limits of one’s obligations toward others. The issue of brand-name 
and generic drug makers’ liability is complicated and difficult enough 
without being obscured in a tangle of irrelevant issues. 
 
 224. See Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 13–15 (arguing that under 
Maryland law, the plaintiff in a products liability action must be able to identify the defendant’s 
product as the source of the plaintiff’s injury). 
 225. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing case law 
establishing that “Maryland law refused to adopt non-identification theories of product 
liability”). 
 226. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266–67 (W.D. Okla. 2009) 
(citing Oklahoma’s rejection of market share liability, alternative liability, concert-of-action 
liability, and enterprise liability theories in granting summary judgment to the defendants); 
Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at *2–3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) 
(concluding that the principles of market share liability foreclosed the imposition of liability on 
defendants who could positively show that they did not manufacture the drug ingested by the 
plaintiff), aff’d per curiam, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 227. See Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 158 (2004) (explaining that market 
share liability responds to situations in which the plaintiff has been injured by one of several 
defendants but cannot easily identify which particular defendant actually caused the injury). 
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C. The Elements of Negligence Claims 
With those preliminary clarifications in mind, I turn to the 
central issue of whether a brand-name drug manufacturer can ever be 
liable for negligence that causes a person to be injured by use of the 
brand-name drug’s generic equivalent. The plaintiffs’ arguments in 
these cases essentially boil down to the straightforward proposition 
that brand-name manufacturers should be held liable when plaintiffs 
can satisfy all the elements required for establishing negligence 
claims. In other words, the plaintiffs do not argue for the creation of 
any sort of special rule for their cases. They do not ask courts to bend 
or waive the normal requirements for negligence claims. Instead, 
plaintiffs simply point to the basic elements required for negligence 
liability and contend that those elements can be met. 
Everyone has a general duty to exercise the care of a reasonable 
person under the circumstances, in order to avoid causing harm to 
others.228 Liability for negligence arises when a defendant’s failure to 
exercise reasonable care was an actual and proximate cause of harm 
to the plaintiff.229 At first blush, at least, it does appear that these basic 
elements of a negligence claim can be satisfied in situations, like in 
the Foster and Conte cases, in which a plaintiff took a generic drug 
but believes the brand-name manufacturer was negligent. For 
example, suppose the plaintiff accuses the brand-name manufacturer 
of negligently designing the product. The plaintiff would need to 
prove that the manufacturer really did fail to exercise reasonable care 
in developing the product, and that the type of illness or other injury 
caused by the drug was reasonably foreseeable. But if the plaintiff 
could do that, the elements of a negligence claim would fall neatly 
into place. The brand-name manufacturer could easily foresee that 
generic manufacturers would copy its design, at least with respect to 
the crucial, active ingredients of the product. It therefore knew that a 
flaw in the drug’s design would cause harm not only to those who 
take the brand-name version of the drug, but also to those taking the 
generic versions. As a result, harm to a plaintiff caused by the faulty 
 
 228. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 214, § 117, at 277 (explaining how courts developed “a general 
duty or standard of care describing the duty of all persons to exercise ordinary care, meaning 
the care of a reasonable person, for the benefit of other persons”); id. § 227, at 578 (“Among 
strangers—those who are in no special relationship that may affect duties owed—the default 
rule is that everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to others to avoid physical harms.”). 
 229. See id. §§ 114–115, at 269–73 (discussing the harm and causation requirements in 
negligence actions). 
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design of a generic drug is a readily foreseeable result of the brand-
name manufacturer’s negligence. 
The same is true when the claim focuses on the adequacy of the 
warnings or instructions accompanying the product. At least as a 
general matter, the brand-name manufacturer had a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in formulating its product labeling. It could readily 
foresee that generic manufacturers would copy the labeling and put it 
on their generic versions of the drug. As a result, a plaintiff might be 
able to show that if the brand-name manufacturer had acted with 
reasonable care in preparing its product’s labeling, the plaintiff never 
would have been harmed by use of the generic drug. Proving such a 
claim may not necessarily be easy. The plaintiff would need to show 
that the brand-name manufacturer really did fail to exercise 
reasonable care in crafting the warnings and instructions, that the 
type of illness or other injury caused by use of the drug was 
reasonably foreseeable, and that adequate warnings or instructions 
would have altered the doctor’s decisionmaking about the use of the 
drug so as to prevent the plaintiff from being harmed by it.230 A 
plaintiff might, however, be able to prove all of these elements. The 
plaintiff might be able to show, for example, that her doctor never 
would have prescribed the drug for the plaintiff if a stronger warning 
about a particular risk had been provided. Alternatively, the plaintiff 
might be able to show that her doctor still would have prescribed the 
drug but would have changed the manner of its use in some way that 
would have prevented or reduced the resulting harm, such as 
prescribing the drug in a lower dosage, for a shorter period of use, or 
with closer monitoring for a particular adverse reaction about which a 
warning had been given. 
When the plaintiff has taken a generic drug and subsequently 
sues the brand-name manufacturer for negligently failing to give 
adequate warnings, it should not matter whether the plaintiff’s doctor 
looked at the labeling on the brand-name version of the drug (or 
some other source of information attributable to the brand-name 
manufacturer, such as the drug’s entry in the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference) or saw the labeling on the generic version of the drug. The 
 
 230. Under the learned intermediary rule, a prescription drug manufacturer generally has a 
duty to give adequate warnings and instructions only to doctors, rather than directly to patients. 
The rationale for this rule is that when a drug is available only by prescription, the doctor is the 
one who really needs the warnings and instructions to make sound decisions about using the 
drug in a patient’s treatment. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 9.6, at 630–33. 
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required causal link between the inadequate warnings and the 
plaintiff’s injury exists either way. If the doctor looked at the brand-
name labeling, a stronger warning provided there by the brand-name 
manufacturer would have reached the doctor. And if the brand-name 
manufacturer had provided a stronger warning in its labeling, the 
same information would have automatically appeared on the generic 
labeling,231 and thus would have reached a doctor who looked only at 
that generic labeling. In either event, the plaintiff may plausibly 
contend that a stronger warning would have prevented her injuries by 
changing her doctor’s decision about the use of the drug. 
Many of the cases about brand-name manufacturers’ liability for 
generic drug injuries have focused on negligent misrepresentation 
claims.232 Like an inadequate warning claim, a negligent 
misrepresentation claim would center on the labeling, advertising, or 
other information provided about the product. But it would require 
proof that the defendant went further than just failing to provide 
important information and instead affirmatively made some false or 
misleading statement about the product.233 Like any other negligence 
claim, a negligent misrepresentation claim is based on the assertion 
that the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care was an actual 
and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.234 More specifically, the 
plaintiff must show that someone reasonably or justifiably relied on 
the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that reliance led to the 
plaintiff’s injury.235 This reliance element is a slightly more precise way 
of articulating the general requirement, applicable to all negligence 
claims, that a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the 
defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.236 
 
 231. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168–71 (4th Cir. 1994); Conte 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 310–11 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 233. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 117–18 (explaining that a defendant’s mere failure to 
communicate potential dangers, as opposed to making an affirmative statement, is normally 
insufficient to constitute a misrepresentation). 
 234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). 
 235. OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 125–26; id. § 3.3, at 133–34. 
 236. See id. § 3.2, at 126 (“Typically, causation is embedded in reliance, and proof of the 
former often establishes the latter.”). That the brand-name manufacturer’s misrepresentation 
may not be the most direct or immediate cause of the injury should not bar the plaintiff’s claim. 
A plaintiff merely needs to show that a defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the 
injury, not that it was the most direct or immediate cause. For example, if one person 
negligently spills gasoline, and another later negligently creates a spark that ignites the gasoline, 
both can be held responsible for the resulting fire. See DOBBS, supra note 214, § 186, at 460 (“If 
the first actor negligently creates a risk of harm and the second actor negligently triggers the 
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A plaintiff suing a brand-name drug manufacturer may be able 
to prove these required elements even though she received the 
generic version of the drug. The plaintiff might show, for example, 
that the brand-name manufacturer falsely overstated the drug’s safety 
or understated its risks, that these misstatements occurred because 
the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care, and that the 
plaintiff’s doctor relied on the misstatements in prescribing the drug. 
If the manufacturer had not made false statements about the drug, 
the plaintiff’s doctor would have made a different decision about 
whether or how to use the drug, and the plaintiff’s injury would have 
been avoided or at least reduced. Again, it should not matter whether 
the plaintiff’s doctor saw the misrepresentation in materials generated 
by the brand-name manufacturer or the generic drug manufacturer.237 
Plaintiffs in these cases thus can establish the prima facie 
elements of a negligence claim against the brand-name manufacturer, 
whether the focus is on product design, inadequate warnings, or 
negligent misrepresentations. That a pharmacy happened to give the 
plaintiff the generic version of the drug, rather than the brand-name 
product, simply does not preclude establishment of the elements 
necessary to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for negligence. 
D. The Presence of Additional Tortfeasors in Products  
Liability Scenarios 
Because plaintiffs can present plausible claims based on the 
standard elements of negligence, drug manufacturers must argue for 
the creation of a special rule that would trump the normal application 
of those elements. Their basic argument is that a drug manufacturer 
should be liable only for harm suffered by those who actually used its 
products.238 They contend that a manufacturer should not be 
 
risk, both actors are tortfeasors, both are causes in fact of the harm, and both are commonly 
held liable . . . .”). 
 237. If the doctor saw the misrepresentation in information produced by the brand-name 
manufacturer, the doctor’s reliance on the brand-name manufacturer’s misrepresentation may 
be direct. But even in the far more rare instances when the doctor saw the misrepresentation 
only in the generic labeling, the required reliance is still present, although the chain of events 
has one small extra step. The brand-name manufacturer initially made the misrepresentation, 
the generic manufacturer relied on that misrepresentation in copying it onto the labeling of the 
generic version of the drug, and the plaintiff’s doctor in turn relied on the misrepresentation as 
reprinted in the generic drug labeling. Either way, the plaintiff’s injury flows out of reliance on 
the brand-name manufacturer’s misstatement about the drug. 
 238. See, e.g., Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Wyeth 
argues . . . that it cannot be held liable to Conte for her injuries caused by generic 
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responsible for injuries that did not directly result from the use of its 
products, even if those injuries were actual and foreseeable results of 
the manufacturer’s negligence. In short, they believe manufacturers 
can only be liable qua manufacturers. 
The drug makers contend that this limitation on their liability is a 
long and well-established principle. “It is hornbook law,” argued the 
brand-name manufacturer in the Conte case, “that a product 
manufacturer owes no duty to a plaintiff who does not use its 
product.”239 Likewise, observers denouncing the Conte decision 
claimed that it has been clear “since the dawn of product liability” 
that “[y]ou can only sue the manufacturer of the product that injured 
you.”240 
Is that true? Again, it may be for strict liability claims, but such 
claims represent an unusual deviation from normal tort law 
principles.241 In the realm of negligence, it is far less clear that any 
such principle exists. 
Consider this example. A plaintiff purchased a new Ford 
automobile. Soon after, while driving through an intersection, she was 
hit by a truck whose driver negligently failed to stop for a red traffic 
light. Although the plaintiff’s car should have been able to withstand 
the impact without causing any injury to the plaintiff, a flaw in the 
design of the car’s gas tank caused the car to explode, leading the 
plaintiff to suffer terrible burn injuries. If the plaintiff asserts tort 
claims against both the truck driver and Ford, the truck driver cannot 
avoid liability by saying he did not manufacture or sell the plaintiff’s 
car. That the truck driver did not manufacture or sell the car would be 
irrelevant because he would not be sued on the ground that he 
manufactured or sold it; he would be sued because of his negligent 
driving. 
Now assume that the truck driver happens to work for Toyota 
and was delivering a load of new Toyota automobiles when he struck 
the plaintiff. The analysis and result do not change. If the plaintiff 
sues Toyota, contending that it is liable for the truck driver’s 
negligence through respondeat superior, Toyota cannot avoid liability 
by saying it is not the company that manufactured the plaintiff’s car. 
 
metoclopramide because Wyeth has no duty to users of the generic version of its products, 
which are produced by other manufacturers.”). 
 239. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 2. 
 240. Beck & Herrmann, supra note 192. 
 241. See supra Part III.A. 
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The plaintiff would not be suing Toyota on the ground that it 
manufactured the car. The plaintiff would be suing Toyota because, 
through its employee, Toyota was negligent in some other respect 
that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. To repeat a term used earlier, 
Toyota would be an additional tortfeasor even though it was not the 
manufacturer of the product that the plaintiff purchased.242 
This hypothetical example is not parallel in all respects to the 
issue of brand-name drug manufacturers’ liability for generic drug 
injuries. It merely demonstrates the simple proposition that a 
manufacturer can be liable, at least in some circumstances, when its 
negligence causes a plaintiff to be injured by a product that the 
manufacturer did not produce. The manufacturer is not blamed for 
manufacturing something it did not manufacture; instead, the 
manufacturer is held liable because it was negligent in some other 
respect. 
To make the hypothetical example somewhat more similar to the 
cases involving brand-name and generic drugs, imagine that Toyota 
was negligent in some way related to its activities as an automaker, 
rather than just through the careless driving of its employee. For 
example, suppose that Toyota negligently designed a gas tank and 
then licensed the dangerous design to the manufacturer of the 
plaintiff’s car; that Toyota went to other automakers, including the 
manufacturer of the plaintiff’s car, and convinced them to stop giving 
certain types of warnings; or that Toyota carelessly made false 
representations about the safety of a very specific component or 
feature of the plaintiff’s car. In those situations, Toyota should not be 
able to escape liability merely by saying that it did not manufacture or 
sell the plaintiff’s car. Courts should instead look carefully at what 
Toyota did and decide whether Toyota’s role in influencing the design 
of the product or the information disseminated about it was 
substantial enough to justify holding Toyota liable for its negligence. 
Courts have taken this approach in a wide variety of 
circumstances. They have held that liability can be imposed, at least 
in some situations, when a defendant did not actually manufacture or 
sell the product in question but nevertheless was negligent in a way 
that contributed to the danger posed by the product. For example, 
courts have held that a nonmanufacturing designer of a product can 
be held liable for injuries attributable to the product’s flawed design 
 
 242. See supra Part III.B. 
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or inadequate warnings.243 A franchisor or trademark licensor can be 
held liable if it participated substantially in developing the design of a 
product even though it did not manufacture the product itself.244 
Likewise, a defendant that endorsed or certified a product as being 
safe can be held liable for negligence even though it did not 
manufacture or sell the product.245 A trade association or other 
organization that sets insufficient safety standards for a product can 
be held liable for negligence even though it did not manufacture or 
sell the product.246 A manufacturer that acquires assets from another 
company may be obligated in some circumstances to give warnings to 
those who purchased products made by the other company in the 
past.247 A manufacturer of machines can be held liable when another 
company fails to put adequate warnings on replacement parts for the 
machines, even though the manufacturer did not make or sell the 
 
 243. See Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 590–91 (Tex. 1986) (finding that the 
defendant could be held liable for failing to warn about the hazards associated with a soft drink 
bottle cap and closure system it designed, even though it did not manufacture or sell the soft 
drink bottle that injured the plaintiff); Melissa Evans Buss, Products Liability and Intellectual 
Property Licensors, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 299, 311–14 (2000) (reviewing cases and 
concluding that a manufacturer can be held liable when it “negligently develops a design, which 
is later embodied in a final product by a separate manufacturer, and a third party’s injuries are 
caused by their negligent design”). 
 244. See Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (W.D. Va. 1982) (“[T]here 
is authority holding that implied warranty principles do extend to franchisors who promote the 
sale of soft drink products but do not actually manufacture or sell the product.”); OWEN, supra 
note 60, § 15.4, at 1030–32 (“Courts widely agree that trademark owners and franchisers that 
substantially control product safety may be subject to liability for injuries from defective 
products made and sold by their licensees.”). 
 245. See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 682, 684–87 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding 
that a magazine publisher would be liable for negligent misrepresentation if one of its magazines 
endorsed dangerous shoes as safe after failing to properly test them); OWEN, supra note 60, 
§ 15.7, at 1050–52 (reviewing cases and finding that courts hold that certifiers and endorsers can 
be liable for negligence even though they are not subject to strict liability). 
 246. See Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that 
the defendant trade association owed the plaintiff a duty of care in setting safety standards for 
the manufacturers and retailers of the plaintiff’s swimming pool and diving board); OWEN, 
supra note 60, § 15.7, at 1053–56 (explaining that trade associations are not subject to strict 
liability but have been held liable in some cases for negligently developing and promulgating 
safety standards for products manufactured by their members); id. § 15.7, at 1058 (noting that 
other types of standard-setting organizations may be held liable for negligence even though they 
do not manufacture or sell the products for which they set standards). 
 247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13 (1998) (explaining 
that a successor manufacturer can be held liable for failing to warn about risks of products made 
by the predecessor manufacturer if the successor provides or agrees to provide repair, 
replacement parts, or similar services to predecessor’s customers); OWEN, supra note 60, § 15.5, 
at 1040–41 (describing these “commonsense principles of responsibility” as “reasonable and 
fair”). 
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replacement parts in question and put adequate warnings on the parts 
that it did manufacture and sell.248 Again, these are just a few 
examples of the broad array of imaginable scenarios in which 
someone who did not manufacture or sell a product that causes injury 
nevertheless can be held liable for negligence that contributes to the 
product’s danger and resulting harm. Examples also abound beyond 
the realm of tort law. In the intellectual property field, those who 
contribute to infringement of a patent, copyright, or trademark can be 
held liable along with those who actually infringe.249 And in securities 
law, those who assist or support the violation of a securities statute or 
rule can be held liable along with those who directly violate the 
provision.250 
None of these examples are perfect parallels to the issue of 
brand-name and generic drugs. Brand-name drug manufacturers do 
not grant licenses to generic drug makers. They do not endorse or 
certify the generic manufacturers’ products. Nor do they urge the 
generic manufacturers to copy their products or labeling. Instead, the 
mimicry of brand-name drug designs and labeling occurs through the 
operation of the FDA’s regulatory scheme for approval of generic 
drugs.251 The FDA demands that generic drug makers follow in the 
brand-name manufacturer’s footsteps if they want to take advantage 
of the abbreviated new drug approval mechanism. The brand-name 
manufacturer thus does not solicit or encourage duplication of its 
products or labeling, but the generic manufacturer does not 
unilaterally or unexpectedly choose to imitate the brand-name 
manufacturer’s actions. The imitation of the brand-name products is 
 
 248. See Clarke Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 591 So. 2d 458, 462 (Ala. 1991) (finding 
that the manufacturer of a sander failed to give adequate warning that replacement parts made 
by another manufacturer might combust); see also Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 517 
N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the manufacturer of an original part could be held 
liable for a design defect even though the plaintiff was actually injured by a replacement part 
that was copied from the manufacturer’s design but was not actually produced by the 
manufacturer). 
 249. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 
be liable as an infringer.”); Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal 
Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366–68 (2006) (discussing the availability of both vicarious liability 
and contributory liability theories to plaintiffs in copyright and trademark infringement actions). 
 250. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and 
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 315 (1989) (noting that secondary liability “has become 
so well established in the securities law that courts rarely question its basis”). 
 251. See supra Part I.A–B. 
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systematic and overseen by the FDA, making it not only highly 
foreseeable to the brand-name manufacturer but also effectively 
subject to the brand-name manufacturer’s control. If the generic drug 
is an insufficiently close copy of the brand-name product, for 
example, the brand-name manufacturer can have the FDA remove 
the generic drug from the market.252 Likewise, if the brand-name 
manufacturer determines that the product’s warnings or instructions 
should be enhanced in some way, the FDA will force generic 
producers of the drug to fall perfectly in line behind the brand-name 
manufacturer’s lead.253 The unique regulatory scheme surrounding 
prescription drugs thus provides a mechanism by which the copying of 
brand-name drugs’ designs and labeling is not initiated or encouraged 
by the brand-name manufacturer, but it is nevertheless systematic, 
predictable, and subject to significant control by the brand-name 
manufacturer through the FDA. 
The prescription drug scenario is therefore unlike situations in 
which one manufacturer unilaterally decides to imitate another 
manufacturer’s design and no other link connects the two companies. 
For example, in Piscitello v. Hobart Corp.,254 a federal district court in 
Massachusetts faced a situation in which the plaintiff injured her hand 
in a meat grinder and sued both the manufacturer of the machine and 
another company whose design the manufacturer had copied.255 The 
judge rejected the claims against the company that developed the 
design but otherwise had no connection to the product or its 
manufacture, saying that “[i]t would be unfair to impose such an 
expansive view of tort liability on those whose original design is 
mimicked without the designer’s permission.”256 Meat grinders, like 
most products, are not subject to anything like the FDA’s regulatory 
scheme, which systematizes the copying of brand-name drugs and 
their labeling and gives brand-name manufacturers the ability to 
foresee and control the actions of their generic imitators. 
 
 252. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 254. Piscitello v. Hobart Corp., 799 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1992). 
 255. Id. at 224–25. 
 256. Id. at 226. The court also noted that there was nothing particularly distinctive about the 
design in question, given that it had been utilized for most grinders over the years. Id. at 225. 
Indeed, the design could not be validly patented because it “did not require invention to devise 
it but only the use of ordinary judgment and mechanical skill.” Id. at 225 n.5 (quoting Hobart 
Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 26 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Conn. 1939), aff’d per curiam, 107 
F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
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In arguing on these points, the brand-name manufacturers often 
seem to be denying the obvious. They maintain that they have no 
control over generic drugs or their producers,257 and they insist that 
they cannot reasonably foresee that dangerous flaws in a brand-name 
product or its labeling will lead to injuries suffered by those taking the 
product’s generic equivalents.258 Many courts, from Foster onward, 
have accepted those assertions.259 The brand-name manufacturers’ 
characterizations of the situation, however, are hard to square with 
reality. If a brand-name drug manufacturer is negligent in designing 
its product or in preparing labeling or other information disseminated 
to doctors, it is highly foreseeable that the risk created will extend to 
those taking the generic substitutes as well as those taking the brand-
name version of the drug. And given that brand-name manufacturers 
effectively dictate crucial aspects of the generic products’ designs and 
the contents of their labeling, the brand-name manufacturers’ 
insistence that they have no control over generic drugs is like a person 
saying that he has no control over his shadow. 
The issue ultimately boils down to how the copying of brand-
name drugs and labeling that occurs under the auspices of the FDA 
and its regulatory scheme should affect the question of liability. Is the 
FDA’s regulatory system a reason to absolve the brand-name 
manufacturers of liability for generic drug injuries, or a reason to say 
that they can be held liable for the foreseeable consequences of their 
negligence regardless of whether a particular patient took the brand-
name or generic version of the drug? That the brand-name 
manufacturer does not voluntarily consent to the generic 
manufacturer’s imitation of the product points toward a conclusion 
that the brand-name manufacturer should not be liable to those 
injured by the generic drug. Several other factors point strongly in the 
 
 257. See Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 1, 23 (repeatedly disclaiming any 
control on Wyeth’s part over the manufacture or sale of the generic drug). 
 258. See id. at 22 (arguing that a brand-name drug manufacturer cannot reasonably foresee 
that its warnings will be relied upon by plaintiffs who ingest the generic version of its products). 
 259. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding 
that to hold a brand-name manufacturer liable for products of generic manufacturers over 
whom it had no control “would be to stretch the concept of foreseeability too far”); Sharp v. 
Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) (“It would be 
manifestly unfair to hold a name brand manufacturer responsible for injuries that arise from a 
product that is beyond its control.”), aff’d per curiam, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); 
Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] manufacturer cannot 
reasonably expect that consumers will rely on the information it provides when actually 
ingesting another company’s drug.”). 
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other direction: the brand-name manufacturers can readily foresee 
generic imitation of their products, can easily identify exactly who is 
producing the generic versions, and, through the FDA, can force 
every generic manufacturer to go along with any change to the 
product or its labeling that safety demands. 
Plausible arguments can be made in either direction. Resolution 
of the issue should not be based on erroneous and overbroad 
generalizations—accepted too often by courts in the past—about 
manufacturers being liable only for the manufacture and sale of their 
own products. Instead, the issue warrants a more cautious 
examination of the real consequences and policy concerns at stake. 
E. The Impact of Brand-Name Manufacturers’ Liability for Generic 
Drug Injuries 
Given that the general principles and rules of tort law do not 
provide a decisive answer, the issue turns on equity and policy 
considerations. Although drug makers have labored mightily to 
portray themselves as having the high ground in these respects, their 
contentions wilt under closer scrutiny. 
Critics of the Conte decision insist that the unfairness of holding 
anyone liable for someone else’s product is particularly acute in the 
context of brand-name and generic prescription drugs. Brand-name 
manufacturers, they argue, lay out the enormous investment in 
research and testing necessary to develop a new drug and to steer it 
through the long and unpredictable FDA approval process.260 They 
then bear the heavy costs of promotional efforts to popularize a drug, 
such as running advertisements and sending out sales representatives 
to inform doctors about the drug.261 The generic manufacturers then 
sweep into the market after the brand-name drug’s patent protection 
has expired and reap profits from selling the drug without having 
incurred any of the costs of its development and promotion.262 The 
brand-name manufacturers believe that these circumstances make it 
“totally unfair and draconian” for them to be held responsible for 
 
 260. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review at 17–20, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 
S169116 (Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (describing the “considerable resources” invested in new drugs and 
the low odds of obtaining FDA approval). 
 261. For a description of brand-name manufacturers’ promotional efforts, see supra notes 
30–34 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 15–16 (noting how 
“generic manufacturers benefit from the innovators’ investment of resources”). 
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injuries suffered through use of the generic drugs.263 Indeed, the 
lawyers who represent drug companies have tried to come up with a 
catchy name for the theory of liability asserted against brand-name 
manufacturers by patients who took generic drugs, dubbing it 
“pioneer liability” or “innovator liability” to underscore the notion 
that it would punish those who do the valuable and difficult work of 
introducing new drugs.264 
These arguments rely on a subtle tactic that distracts courts’ 
attention from the real issue presented. Whenever the brand-name 
manufacturers cite fairness concerns, they compare themselves only 
to the generic drug makers.265 They emphasize reasons why a brand-
name manufacturer may deserve liability less than the generic drug 
producers who ride on its coattails. By presenting the fairness 
question as a choice between blaming the generic drug maker or the 
brand-name manufacturer, they omit the plaintiff from the calculus. 
They convince courts that the equities of the situation favor the 
brand-name manufacturer over the generic producer, never 
addressing the possibility that the innocent plaintiff’s needs should 
trump those of both manufacturers in any truly comprehensive 
assessment of what is fair and just in these circumstances. 
Holding a defendant liable for negligence that was a significant 
cause of a plaintiff’s injury is not unfair. If the plaintiff took a generic 
drug, the brand-name manufacturer will not be subject to strict 
 
 263. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 23. 
 264. See, e.g., Beck & Herrmann, supra note 192 (asserting that the Conte decision “created 
a huge ‘free rider’ problem in that pioneer manufacturers are stuck with liability for generic 
products that . . . they do not get any profit from”); California Becomes First State to Recognize 
Innovator Liability, MAYER BROWN (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/
article.asp?id=6060&nid=6 (“[I]nnovator liability is currently being considered by courts in a 
number of additional jurisdictions. In light of the appellate court decision in Conte, courts may 
now revisit the reasoning of prior, well-established holdings.”). 
 265. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 16 (“[T]he Court 
of Appeal’s holding is fundamentally unfair and contrary to the public interest. It saddles an 
innovator with a duty to all those who use its competitors’ generic products and concomitantly 
immunizes the generic manufacturers from liability to users of their own products. In so doing, 
it unfairly inflates the costs of the name-brand manufacturer and unfairly minimizes the costs of 
its generic manufacturer competitors by shifting costs from the latter to the former.”); Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 25–26 (“When a prescription is written so as to 
allow generic substitution; the pharmacist dispenses a generic product as permitted; the generic 
manufacturer profits from the sale of its product; and the product ultimately causes harm, there 
is no reason or justification for the brand name manufacturer, whose product was not prescribed 
exclusively, was not sold, was not used, and did not cause harm, and who did not profit from a 
sale—indeed, lost a sale to a generic competitor—to incur liability for harm caused by its 
competitor’s product.”). 
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liability; it will be liable only if it failed to use reasonable care in some 
vital aspect of developing and testing the drug or in crafting the drug’s 
warnings, instructions, or promotional statements.266 Simply requiring 
the manufacturer to act with the care of a reasonable person should 
not be too much to demand. As the plaintiff in Conte rightly asked, 
“[W]hat is unfair about requiring a defendant to shoulder its share of 
responsibility for injuries shown to have been caused, at least in part, 
by its dissemination of false information, which it reasonably should 
expect to be relied on by its intended recipients?”267 Between the 
brand-name manufacturer and the generic drug manufacturer, 
fairness might favor the former. But between a brand-name 
manufacturer that acted negligently and the innocent plaintiff who 
suffered serious harm as a result, the fairness inquiry easily tilts in 
favor of the latter. In the Foster case, for example, the brand-name 
manufacturer allegedly knew that the product and its generic 
imitations posed a potentially fatal danger to children, but failed to 
give adequate warnings that would have saved lives but hurt sales.268 
The FDA eventually confirmed that the drug needed a much stronger 
warning, but that was too late for Brandy Foster and the other 
children already dead as a result of the manufacturer’s actions.269 
Likewise, in the Conte case, the brand-name manufacturer allegedly 
knew about but downplayed the drug’s risks, causing Elizabeth Conte 
and many others to develop a severe and potentially life-threatening 
neurological disorder.270 Again, the FDA eventually confirmed that 
the product’s warnings were dangerously flawed.271 The plaintiffs in 
this category of cases deserve the opportunity to prove that their 
allegations are true. And if they succeed, holding the brand-name 
drug makers responsible for the harm resulting from their negligence 
is far from unfair. 
The injustice of giving brand-name manufacturers immunity 
from liability for generic drug injuries is particularly severe to the 
extent that it would mean no drug maker would have any legal 
responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries. Courts rejecting claims brought 
against brand-name manufacturers by patients who took generic 
 
 266. See supra Part III.A. 
 267. Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 18. 
 268. See supra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 145–57, 168–77 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
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drugs often seem to assume plaintiffs will still have adequate 
remedies because the generic drug manufacturers will be liable.272 
This assumption, however, glosses over the arguments made by 
generic drug manufacturers in these cases and the real possibility that 
a plaintiff who took a generic drug could be left with no viable claim 
against any manufacturer, even for harm caused by an egregiously 
flawed product or a grossly inadequate warning. 
Indeed, the generic drug makers believe they should never face 
any liability because federal law should preempt all state-law tort 
claims against them.273 The Supreme Court will soon make an 
important ruling on the preemption issue,274 but even if the Court 
rules against preemption, the generic drug manufacturers have a 
number of other cards to play in many instances. In particular, they 
contend that they should never be liable for providing inadequate or 
misleading statements in drug labeling if the plaintiff’s doctor never 
actually looked at the generic drug’s labeling and instead saw only the 
information disseminated by the brand-name manufacturer.275 In 
other words, when a doctor gets information about a drug from the 
brand-name manufacturer, but the patient receives the generic drug, 
both the brand-name and generic manufacturers will insist that they 
can have no liability. The brand-name manufacturer will say the 
plaintiff did not take its product, and the generic drug maker will say 
the plaintiff’s doctor did not rely on its warnings or representations 
about the product. According to the drug companies, both 
manufacturers should escape liability in those circumstances, even if 
both were negligent and their wrongdoing combined to cause 
catastrophic harm to the plaintiff. 
Likewise, in the opposite situation, when a plaintiff’s doctor saw 
the flawed warnings and misleading representations about the drug 
only in the generic product’s labeling, but the plaintiff took the brand-
name drug, both manufacturers again would insist that neither can be 
held liable. This situation would occur very rarely, if ever, because 
doctors typically do not learn about a drug from the generic product’s 
 
 272. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We do not 
accept the assertion that a generic manufacturer is not responsible for negligent 
misrepresentations on its product labels if it did not initially formulate the warnings and 
representations itself.”); supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 275. Conte v. Wyeth, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 318–19 (Ct. App. 2008); see supra notes 185–87 
and accompanying text. 
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labeling.276 Instead, doctors are much more likely to receive 
information generated by the brand-name manufacturer, whether 
through the brand-name product’s labeling, the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference, or sales representatives or advertisements touting the 
brand-name drug. But to the extent that it ever happened, the 
manufacturers’ responses to the dilemma would be just as unfair as in 
the more common scenario in which the doctor relied on information 
about the brand-name drug but the patient received the generic 
equivalent. Either way, the doctor saw one company’s labeling, but 
the plaintiff received another company’s product. According to the 
manufacturers, the injured patient thus has no claim against either. 
Table 1 illustrates the possibilities. The drug companies’ 
arguments would preclude liability for inadequate warnings or 
misrepresentations in every instance in which the doctor’s source of 
information did not match the pharmacist’s source of the drug itself. 
No manufacturer would be liable in situations like Foster and Conte, 
represented by the upper-right quadrant of the diagram, or in the 
much less common but equally problematic scenario represented by 
the lower-left quadrant. 
Table 1. Implications of the Drug Companies’ Arguments about 
Inadequate Warning and Misrepresentation Claims 
  The patient takes the drug made by . . . 
  Brand-name manufacturer Generic manufacturer 
Brand-name 
manufacturer 
Brand-name manufacturer 
can be liable 
No manufacturer 
can be liable 
The doctor 
relies on 
information 
from . . . 
Generic 
manufacturer 
No manufacturer 
can be liable 
Generic manufacturer 
can be liable 
 
When the brand-name manufacturer negligently made 
dangerous missteps in preparing its warnings and other 
representations about its product, and when the generic manufacturer 
carelessly repeated those statements verbatim on its labeling, what 
 
 276. I suspect that there may never be a situation in which a doctor prescribes a drug based 
solely on information generated by the generic drug manufacturer. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum 
Concerning Pertinent Aspects of the Rostron Article, supra note 202, at 8 (“The likelihood of 
any doctor’s even possessing a generic prescription drug’s label, much less reading or relying on 
it, in the ordinary course of his or her practice, is so remote as to border on the nonexistent.”). 
But I nevertheless address that scenario, because it is impossible to be certain or to prove that it 
never happens, and because I think it is helpful to consider every possible permutation in 
developing theories about the handling of these situations. 
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legitimate basis could exist in principle, policy, or fairness for 
absolving both manufacturers of liability because of a fortuitous 
mismatch between which version of the drug’s labeling the doctor 
happened to remember seeing and which version of the drug the 
pharmacist happened to dispense? The drug manufacturers never 
squarely answer that question. Instead, one manufacturer will simply 
argue that “it wasn’t my drug,” and the other will separately contend 
that “it wasn’t my label.” And they will hope that the court lets each 
avoid liability. Indeed, when pressed at an oral argument by a judge 
who wanted to know why a plaintiff injured because of inadequate 
warnings should be left with no recourse because her pharmacist 
dispensed the generic version of a drug, the defendants suggested that 
“consumers who opt for generic drugs over name-brand equivalents 
may have effectively lost their right to recompense for injuries 
suffered from inadequate warnings in the bargain.”277 In other words, 
if the plaintiff saved a little money by taking the generic version of a 
drug, the plaintiff should not be heard to complain no matter how 
harmful the drug turns out to be or how careless its manufacturers 
turn out to have been. 
This argument overlooks the fact that many consumers have 
little choice about whether to receive generic drugs because health 
insurance plans or government programs like Medicaid may refuse to 
cover brand-name drugs once generic substitutes become available.278 
Even when consumers do willingly pick generic drugs to save money, 
they do not thereby waive their right to hold negligent parties liable. 
Imagine, for example, facing the parents of an infant child who died 
as a result of taking cough syrup, and telling them that the brand-
name manufacturer that wrote the product’s inadequate warnings will 
not be held responsible for negligently putting profits ahead of safety, 
but that, on the other hand, they should look on the bright side 
because they probably saved a few dollars when the pharmacist gave 
 
 277. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 n.40 (D.N.H. 2009). The judge in 
Bartlett posed this question in the context of deciding whether federal law preempts inadequate 
warning claims against generic drug manufacturers. The judge concluded that Congress could 
not have intended to leave consumers of generic drugs without a remedy against a manufacturer 
for harm suffered because a drug’s labeling provided inadequate warnings. Id. at 308–09. 
 278. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., No. 05 C 1490, 2005 WL 1323435, at *15 (N.D. 
Ill. June 3, 2005) (explaining that once a generic version of a brand-name drug becomes 
available, the managed-care provider will pay more toward the generic version than toward the 
branded product), vacated on other grounds, 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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them a generic version of the cough syrup.279 That notion “is not only 
distasteful but also contrary to fundamental principles of tort law.”280 
Brand-name manufacturers stand on firmer ground, however, 
when they insist that generic drug makers should not be given unfair 
advantages over them.281 For example, the California Court of Appeal 
concluded in Conte that although the plaintiff could proceed to trial 
on her negligent misrepresentation claim against the brand-name 
drug manufacturer, the generic manufacturers could not be held 
liable because Conte’s doctor did not look at the generic product 
labeling or otherwise rely on any generic manufacturer’s 
representations about the product.282 By letting the generic 
manufacturers avoid responsibility for Conte’s injuries, the court 
created an unfair imbalance between the treatment of the brand-
name and generic drug producers. Under the Conte approach, if a 
drug lacks adequate warnings, its brand-name manufacturer may 
wind up being liable for harm to those who took either the brand-
name or the generic version of the drug, whereas the generic 
manufacturers likely will wind up not being liable to anyone. That 
asymmetry is particularly unfair given that the brand-name 
manufacturers make substantial investments in developing new drugs 
from which generic producers profit by copying. In the pithy words of 
one blog reader reacting to discussion of the Conte decision, “I should 
get in on this generic med business—tons of money and no risk.”283  
Although fairness considerations should tip the balance on these 
issues toward innocent plaintiffs and against manufacturers, they do 
not justify such an odd misallocation of the responsibility between the 
brand-name manufacturer and its generic imitators. 
The unfairness of this imbalance is exacerbated by the inherent 
difficulty of determining why a doctor prescribed a certain drug for a 
particular patient. Researchers have found, for example, that doctors 
often do not recognize or do not accurately report the factors that 
 
 279. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 280. Bartlett, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 308 n.40. 
 281. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 16 (complaining 
that the Conte decision “saddles an innovator with a duty to all those who use its competitors’ 
generic products and concomitantly immunizes the generic manufacturers from liability to users 
of their own products,” thereby “unfairly inflat[ing] the costs of the name-brand manufacturer 
and unfairly minimiz[ing] the costs of its generic manufacturer competitors”). 
 282. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
 283. Ed Silverman, Brand-Name Makers Liable for Generic Injuries, PHARMALOT (Nov. 8, 
2008, 8:34 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/11/brand-name-makers-liable-for-
generic-injuries (comment posted by “G” on Nov. 8, 2008, 4:56 PM). 
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actually drove their therapeutic decisionmaking about use of 
prescription drugs.284 When asked why they chose a drug, doctors 
exaggerate the extent to which they rely on scientific sources, such as 
reports in medical journals, while understating the influence of 
commercial channels of information such as a drug company’s 
advertisements and sales representatives.285 Doctors’ self-assessments 
therefore seem to be unreliable indicators of what really drives 
prescribing behavior.286 
Cases like Foster and Conte illustrate the perils of putting too 
much weight on what doctors say about their reasons for prescribing a 
drug. In each case, the doctor’s deposition testimony about his 
prescription decisionmaking was equivocal and ambiguous.287 
Compounding that difficulty, the drug manufacturers in each case 
procured declarations from the doctors that muddied the matter even 
further.288 The reality is that doctors typically learn about drugs from 
an array of sources,289 and it is generally unrealistic to expect them to 
be able to pinpoint exactly which sources or pieces of information 
they relied upon in prescribing a drug for a particular patient. This 
problem is not a reason to give drug manufacturers immunity from 
liability, but rather it demonstrates why courts should strive to handle 
these sorts of cases in ways that treat plaintiffs and defendants fairly 
without putting undue weight on doctors’ unreliable self-reporting. 
Although important concerns about fairness and sound public 
policy exist on all sides of the issue, manufacturers ultimately should 
be held responsible when their negligence causes severe harm to 
others. In cases like Foster, courts have gone too far in categorically 
exempting brand-name drug manufacturers from liability to those 
injured by use of generic drugs. In drawing the boundaries of liability, 
however, courts should take into account the potential for unfairly 
creating an imbalance in the liability exposure of brand-name and 
generic drug producers, as well as the difficulties of determining the 
particular sources of information on which a doctor relied in 
 
 284. See Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific Versus Commercial Sources 
of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4, 4 (1982) (“This limits 
the value of self-report as a means of determining how physicians make prescribing decisions.”). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 7. 
 287. See supra notes 98–103, 160–65 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 104–08, 166–67 and accompanying text. 
 289. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 24. 
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prescribing a drug for a patient. Part IV proposes a scheme of liability 
that takes account of these myriad concerns. 
IV.  A PROPOSED APPROACH TO LIABILITY OF BRAND-NAME AND 
GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS 
Weighing the significant considerations at stake when a plaintiff 
asserts tort claims based on a harmful flaw in the design or labeling of 
the brand-name and generic versions of a drug,290 the liability 
framework described here seeks to achieve a fair balance of the 
interests of injured plaintiffs, brand-name manufacturers, and their 
generic counterparts. 
A. Design-Defect Claims 
In cases in which a patient took a brand-name drug and claims to 
have suffered harm because of a defect in the product’s design, the 
analysis will be relatively simple. The brand-name manufacturer may 
be liable because it designed, manufactured, and sold the item that 
caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. The precise contours of that 
liability vary from state to state and continue to be the subject of 
intense controversy.291 In particular, courts disagree about the extent 
to which strict liability should be available for a design-defect claim 
when the product is a prescription drug.292 But under whatever 
approach the relevant state uses, a brand-name manufacturer might 
 
 290. Manufacturing defect claims do not raise the sorts of problems discussed in this Article. 
Unlike a flaw in a drug’s design or labeling, a manufacturing defect typically will be a problem 
unique to one manufacturer. For example, if a mistake on a generic drug manufacturer’s 
production line causes some units of the product to be tainted with impurities or to contain the 
wrong amount of a crucial ingredient, there would be no sound reason to hold the brand-name 
manufacturer responsible, barring some sort of unusual scenario in which the brand-name 
manufacturer was somehow involved in setting up or running the generic manufacturer’s 
operations. Likewise, no reason would exist for holding generic drug makers responsible for 
errors occurring in production of the brand-name drug. 
 291. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–79 (“Many have been bewitched, bedazzled, 
and bewildered in attempting to figure just how principles of design defectiveness should be 
applied to prescription drugs . . . .”); Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and 
Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical 
Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 707 (1990) (“Unfortunately, the courts seem unable to agree on a 
consistent set of liability rules to apply in drug injury cases.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 
15, at 162–81 (responding to criticisms of the Third Restatement’s approach to design-defect 
claims against prescription drug manufacturers); Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability 
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 842–48 (2009) (explaining the different 
approaches courts use in resolving design-defect claims for prescription drugs). 
 292. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–79. 
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be liable when the plaintiff took the brand-name drug. Generic 
manufacturers, on the other hand, should not be liable for a design 
flaw in a brand-name product. They neither manufactured that 
product nor played a role in determining its design. 
The situation is more complicated when the plaintiff instead took 
a generic version of the drug. In that scenario, the brand-name 
manufacturer and generic manufacturer share responsibility for the 
design of the product that the plaintiff received, because the brand-
name manufacturer initially developed the drug, and the generic 
manufacturer copied key aspects of that original design to produce a 
product close enough in its material characteristics to earn FDA 
approval as a generic equivalent. Both the brand-name manufacturer 
and the generic manufacturer thus have a sufficient connection to the 
product’s design to justify imposing liability on both for harm 
resulting from a dangerous flaw in the design. 
The brand-name manufacturers will vigorously contest this 
conclusion on the ground that they should not be liable for a design 
defect in someone else’s product. Moreover, the approach that I 
suggest creates some asymmetry, with brand-name manufacturers 
bearing some risk of liability for design flaws in generic products, but 
generic manufacturers facing no risk of liability for design defects in 
brand-name drugs. 
Two considerations, however, could soften the effect on brand-
name manufacturers. One is that a plaintiff who took a generic drug 
will be able to prevail on a design-defect claim against the brand-
name manufacturer only by proving negligence. In other words, strict 
liability cannot be imposed, and the brand-name manufacturer will be 
able to avoid liability simply by exercising reasonable care in 
developing the product. This would be consistent with the general 
view in products liability that nonmanufacturing designers can be 
held liable for negligence but are not subject to strict liability.293 
In addition, it would be appropriate for courts in these 
circumstances, in which a plaintiff who took the generic drug prevails 
on a design-defect claim, to assign primary liability to the generic 
manufacturer and to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable only in 
a secondary capacity. If the generic manufacturer is capable of paying 
the judgment (or whatever share of the judgment is assigned to that 
manufacturer under comparative fault or similar principles), it should 
 
 293. See supra notes 74–75, 243 and accompanying text. 
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be required to do so. The brand-name manufacturer would become 
obligated to pay only in the event that the generic manufacturer was 
defunct, bankrupt, or otherwise unable to compensate the plaintiff. 
Tort law utilizes this sort of primary-secondary liability structure 
in other contexts. The most prominent example is the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, under which an employer can be held liable for a 
tort committed by its employee within the scope of the employment.294 
The employee has primary liability, while the employer’s liability is 
only secondary in nature, and therefore the employer is entitled to 
demand full indemnification from the employee for any amount it 
pays the plaintiff.295 Products liability law provides another example. 
Although courts can impose strict tort liability on wholesale and retail 
sellers of a defective product, the liability of these nonmanufacturing 
sellers is secondary to that of the manufacturer.296 If unaware of the 
defect, the wholesale or retail seller may be liable to a plaintiff, but 
then will be entitled to full indemnification by the manufacturer.297 In 
each of these situations, the defendant with secondary liability 
essentially bears the burden of compensating the plaintiff only if the 
primarily liable defendant cannot do so. 
This sort of primary-secondary liability approach would be 
appropriate for design-defect claims brought by plaintiffs who took 
generic drugs, but not because brand-name manufacturers should be 
forced to serve as insurers or guarantors for the liabilities of the 
generic drug producers. Likewise, the idea is not that brand-name 
manufacturers should be subjected to unwarranted liability merely 
because they may have deeper pockets than many generic drug 
producers. Liability instead should be structured in this manner 
because sufficient grounds exist for imposing liability on both the 
 
 294. See DOBBS, supra note 214, § 333, at 905 (explaining the vicarious liability theory of 
respondeat superior). 
 295. Id. § 333, at 906. 
 296. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2) (1979) (“[I]ndemnity is 
granted [when t]he indemnitor supplied a defective chattel . . . as a result of which both 
[tortfeasors] were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed 
to discover the defect . . . .”). 
 297. Id. For a thorough discussion of the issue, see Dragan M. Ćetković, Loss Shifting: 
Upstream Common Law Indemnity in Products Liability, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 75, 79 (1994). Some 
states have gone further and enacted “innocent seller” statutes giving retailers and other 
nonmanufacturing sellers even greater protection from liability than that afforded by the 
common law doctrine of indemnification. Id.; see also OWEN, supra note 60, § 15.2, at 1010–11 
& nn.81–90 (explaining that some states, in response to fairness concerns, have enacted statutes 
to shield retailers from liability and “in at least a couple instances statutory provisions exempt 
non-manufacturers unconditionally from strict products liability in tort”).  
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brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer, but the 
former’s link to the product is not as direct as that of the latter. Put 
another way, between the brand-name manufacturer who acted 
negligently and the innocent plaintiff who suffered serious harm as a 
result, the law should come down on the side of the plaintiff. But 
between the brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer, 
the balance tips in favor of imposing liability primarily on the latter 
because it manufactured and profited from the sale of the particular 
item that directly inflicted the plaintiff’s injuries. 
B. Inadequate Warning and Misrepresentation Claims 
Inadequate warnings and misrepresentations pose difficult issues 
as well, and they have been the focus of Foster, Conte, and most of 
the other relevant cases in this area. Although the line between an 
inadequate warning claim and a misrepresentation claim is sometimes 
indistinct, the former essentially involves omission of important 
information about the product’s risks, whereas the latter typically 
involves a false statement about the product.298 These types of claims 
thus relate not only to the product itself but also to the information 
provided about the product. That duality underlies the dilemma 
posed by these claims in cases about brand-name and generic drugs. If 
one manufacturer supplied the product itself, but another supplied 
information about the product, who should be responsible for harm 
that results if the product causes injury because the information was 
inadequate, misleading, or erroneous? 
The drug manufacturers’ arguments ultimately would lead to the 
conclusion that a defendant can be held liable only if it supplied both 
the drug that the plaintiff received and the faulty information on 
which the plaintiff’s doctor relied.299 When there was a mismatch 
between the source of the drug and the source of information, neither 
manufacturer could be held accountable. In some instances, the 
plaintiff might have viable claims against other parties, such as a 
medical malpractice claim against a doctor, but many plaintiffs would 
simply be unable to recover any compensation. The brand-name and 
generic manufacturers would avoid liability even if they each acted in 
appallingly negligent ways and unmistakably caused the plaintiff to 
 
 298. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 117–23 (discussing whether a defendant’s failure to 
disclose information about a product can support a misrepresentation claim or only a failure-to-
warn claim). 
 299. See supra Table 1, notes 272–80, and accompanying text. 
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suffer very severe harm. Rather than permit this unjust result, courts 
should recognize that a drug manufacturer can be held liable even if it 
did not supply both the product and the faulty information that 
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 
Reaching that conclusion, however, leaves unanswered some 
difficult questions about exactly what the scope of manufacturers’ 
liability should be in various situations. Table 2 lays out, once again, 
each of the four basic scenarios that may arise. 
Table 2. A Proposed Approach to Inadequate Warning and 
Misrepresentation Claims 
  The patient takes the drug made by . . . 
  
Brand-name 
manufacturer 
Generic manufacturer 
Brand-name 
manufacturer 
Brand-name 
manufacturer 
can be liable 
Generic manufacturer can 
be liable (with brand-name 
manufacturer only 
secondarily liable) 
The doctor 
relies on 
information 
from . . . Generic 
manufacturer 
Brand-name 
manufacturer can be 
liable (with generic 
manufacturer only 
secondarily liable) 
Generic manufacturer can 
be liable 
 
In each situation, one could argue that all manufacturers of the 
drug should be liable because, in some sense, the conduct of every 
manufacturer was an actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm. For 
example, if a patient took the brand-name drug and her doctor 
looked only at the brand-name product’s labeling, one could argue 
that the generic manufacturers nevertheless caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries by failing to speak up about the product’s risks. If a generic 
manufacturer had told the FDA that the information in the product’s 
labeling was inadequate or misleading, the FDA could have required 
every producer of the drug, including the brand-name manufacturer, 
to change the labeling. Such a change could have saved the plaintiff 
from suffering harm. Likewise, if a patient took a generic version of 
the drug and her doctor relied upon information solely from the 
generic product’s labeling, the plaintiff could still blame the brand-
name manufacturer for drafting the flawed content of the original 
labeling that the generic manufacturer copied. If the brand-name 
manufacturer had written adequate labeling in the first place, or later 
asked the FDA for necessary changes to ensure safe use of the drug, 
the plaintiff would not have been injured. 
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Though perhaps liability could theoretically be imposed on every 
manufacturer of the drug even in situations in which one 
manufacturer actually provided both the drug and the information on 
which the patient’s doctor relied, as a practical matter this solution 
would stretch the net of liability too far. Although all of the drug’s 
manufacturers may have acted negligently, and although each one’s 
conduct technically would have been an actual cause of the plaintiff’s 
harm, the link between a manufacturer and the injury becomes 
weaker and more indirect if the manufacturer neither produced the 
drug that the plaintiff received nor generated the information that the 
plaintiff’s doctor saw. At some point, the interests weighing in the 
plaintiff’s favor can no longer justify the sheer logistical difficulties 
presented by the proliferation of potential liability. For example, 
imagine a situation in which a patient took a drug manufactured by 
Company X, based entirely on information supplied by Company X, 
but dozens or even hundreds of other companies made the same drug, 
and thus could have acted to strengthen the warnings and prevent the 
harm.300 Would it really be worth the additional complexity of making 
all of those companies, in addition to Company X, potentially liable 
for the injury? Moreover, allowing all manufacturers of the drug to be 
held liable would open the door to very difficult questions about 
allocating liability among them. That thorny nest of issues can be 
avoided by drawing a simple and common-sense line that limits 
liability to the one manufacturer that produced both the drug that the 
plaintiff received and the information that the plaintiff’s doctor saw. 
Lines must be drawn somewhere.301 
This still leaves the more difficult dilemma of what to do in 
situations in which one manufacturer made the drug but another 
generated the labeling or other information on which the doctor 
relied in prescribing the drug. In these situations, with only two 
manufacturers involved, each having a distinct and significant 
connection to the plaintiff’s injury, no extreme practical difficulties or 
complexities weigh against imposing liability on both manufacturers. 
The most common scenario, addressed in cases like Foster and Conte 
and illustrated in the upper right quadrant of Table 2, occurs when 
 
 300. That a drug could be produced by hundreds of different manufacturers is not merely a 
hypothetical possibility. See Rostron, supra note 227, at 159 (describing how hundreds of 
pharmaceutical companies produced the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)). 
 301. In the immortal words of Judge William Andrews, “We draw an uncertain and 
wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 
99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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the patient took the generic drug but the doctor relied exclusively on 
information from the drug’s brand-name producer. The opposite 
situation, represented by the lower left quadrant of Table 2, could 
also happen, with the patient taking the brand-name drug but the 
patient’s doctor relying on information from a generic manufacturer, 
although that is likely to be a very rare occurrence.302 
In these situations, in which one manufacturer supplied the drug 
and the other provided the faulty information about the drug, both 
manufacturers should be potentially liable. Each has a direct and 
substantial link to the plaintiff’s use of the drug and resulting harm. 
Regardless of whether the plaintiff received the brand-name or 
generic version of the drug, the brand-name manufacturer could have 
prevented the plaintiff’s injuries by acting carefully and by providing 
adequate and accurate information about its product. Likewise, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff took the brand-name or generic 
drug, the generic manufacturer could have prevented the harm by 
pointing out the flaws in the information being disseminated about 
the product and by asking the FDA to take corrective action. When 
each manufacturer has such a strong causal connection to the 
plaintiff’s injuries, both should potentially be liable. 
The liability of the two manufacturers in these situations could 
have the same primary-secondary structure suggested for design-
defect claims.303 Whichever manufacturer actually made the drug that 
a plaintiff received should be primarily liable; the other manufacturer, 
which generated the information on which the plaintiff’s doctor 
relied, should be obligated to pay damages only if the primarily liable 
manufacturer turns out to be insolvent or otherwise unable to pay. 
This would alleviate at least some of the unfairness that brand-name 
manufacturers see in being held liable when generic manufacturers 
profited by copying the brand-name product and riding the coattails 
of the brand-name manufacturers’ research efforts and discoveries. If 
generic manufacturers capture most of the market for the drug, they 
will wind up bearing the bulk of the liability to those successfully 
asserting inadequate-warning or misrepresentation claims. 
This approach to liability of brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers also would have the salutary effect of diminishing the 
significance of evidentiary disputes about what information a 
particular doctor had in mind when prescribing a drug for a certain 
 
 302. See supra notes 36–37, 276 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra Part IV.A. 
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patient. As past cases like Foster and Conte illustrate, that is often an 
extremely muddled factual question to which no clear answer will 
exist.304 The approach proposed here reduces the chances that a 
plaintiff’s entire case will hinge on difficult determinations about a 
doctor’s hazy and conflicting recollections. For example, when the 
plaintiff took the generic drug, the generic drug maker will be the 
manufacturer with primary liability for inadequate warnings or 
misrepresentations. If the generic manufacturer can pay the damages 
awarded, trying to prove that the brand-name manufacturer is 
secondarily liable because the plaintiff’s doctor relied on its 
information will be a moot point. When the generic manufacturer 
cannot pay, the brand-name manufacturer’s potential secondary 
liability will become relevant and therefore the question of what 
information the doctor considered may become crucial. The approach 
proposed here, however, will reduce to some extent the odds that a 
plaintiff’s entire recovery turns on nebulous factual determinations 
about what influenced a doctor’s decision to write a prescription. 
CONCLUSION 
The California Court of Appeal defied an imposing body of 
precedent when it ruled in Conte that a brand-name drug 
manufacturer could be liable for harm suffered by a person who took 
a generic product made by another company. Although widely 
scorned as a misguided and aberrational departure from sound policy 
and tort principles, Conte in fact represents the most careful and 
sophisticated consideration that any court has given to these difficult 
issues. Rather than brush aside the plaintiff’s arguments with 
conclusory assumptions and crude overgeneralizations, the California 
court followed basic tort principles and methodically reviewed the 
elements of the claims asserted and the crucial competing interests 
underlying the case. Whether one agrees with its conclusions, the 
California court deserves credit for giving these issues the fresh look 
that they deserved. 
Though I ultimately come out on the plaintiffs’ side of the key 
questions analyzed here, no one should doubt that imposing liability 
on drug manufacturers is a serious matter that deserves courts’ most 
cautious and thorough analysis. Drug companies engage in a business 
of critical importance, developing products of enormous potential 
 
 304. See supra notes 98–108, 160–67 and accompanying text. 
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benefit to humanity. Tort law could go too far in discouraging the 
development of innovative new drugs. The application of legal rules 
could be skewed too much against defendants in drug cases, with 
judges and juries demanding perfection that cannot be attained and 
seeing negligence that does not really exist. Overwarning about every 
imaginable risk may drive doctors and patients to overlook truly 
significant precautionary information, deter doctors from prescribing 
worthwhile drugs, or scare patients out of taking drugs that would 
benefit them. These risks are real. 
At the same time, drug companies also have been responsible for 
some of the world’s most notorious product catastrophes, such as 
DES, the Dalkon Shield, and thalidomide.305 The FDA’s regulatory 
oversight repeatedly has proven insufficient to prevent unreasonably 
dangerous drugs from reaching consumers.306 Tort law provides vital 
incentives for drug makers to act with appropriate care. Courts 
should apply tort law in a manner that encourages drug companies to 
continue producing innovative products but also to act reasonably to 
ensure that their products are safe and accompanied by adequate 
warnings and accurate information. Striking the right balance is a 
challenge, but it is one that courts must continue striving to meet. 
These issues can quite literally be matters of life and death. 
 
 305. See generally CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, THE BITTEREST PILL: HOW DRUG 
COMPANIES FAIL TO PROTECT WOMEN AND HOW LAWSUITS SAVE THEIR LIVES (2008) 
(discussing the serious injuries and deaths caused by DES, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, and 
other products). 
 306. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF 
THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE 
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 17 (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P. Burke eds., 2007) 
(“FDA’s performance in approving drugs or monitoring their safety after approval has been 
questioned and criticized.”). For a discussion of how political influence has damaged the FDA’s 
scientific integrity, see generally James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second 
Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
939 (2008). 
